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FORWARD 
This thesis concerns two of the most important social factors in the United States: 
race and marriage. 
In the U.S., the dominant, although in no way only, racial distinction is between 
African Americans and Caucasian Americans. For the purposes of this paper, the term 
Black will be used interchangeably with African American, and the term White will be 
applied to all Caucasian Americans. I chose to use the terms White and Black when 
discussing race in America, particularly in regard to interracial marriage, because the 
majority of the race-based distinction was drawn from skin color, despite the suggestion 
that race could be measured by blood composition or through the empirical approach of 
tracing racial heritage by ancestry. Thus, the terms White and Black draw attention to not 
only the racial distinction between these two groups, but also what this social barrier was 
based upon: color. 
Similarly, I have decided to capitalize both the terms Black and White, since both 
are being used for the same function - to identify a racial group in America - and as my 
own way of attempting to show that while racial distinctions exist in American society, at 
the heart of it we are all people and should all be recognized as such and, therefore, be 
given equal value. Likewise, I will use the terms miscegenation, interracial marriage, 
Black-White marriage, and intermarriage interchangeably to discuss any marriage 
involving one Caucasian and one African American. 
When discussing interracial marriage, I will largely be dividing society between 
White and Black, and between North and South. This means that I will refer to “White 
society” and to “Southerners” as socio-racial groups numerous times throughout this 
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thesis. However, this is not to overlook the fact that these divisions are fluid, and that 
these terms are being employed simplistically; there were Whites, in both the North and 
South, who supported or desired to have their own interracial marriage, and there were 
Southerners who supported the legalization of intermarriage. Not all Whites, nor all 
Southerners, opposed interracial marriage, just as not all Blacks or Northerners supported 
intermarriage. However, for the most part, the opposition to intermarriage was stronger in 
the South than the North, and was more staunchly opposed by White men than any other 
gendered racial group. For this reason, and because numerous primary and secondary 
sources provided evidence of this divide, I will be simplifying the complex socio-racial 
climate into North-South and Black-White binaries. 
In the words of historian Peggy Pascoe, 
Between 1864 and 1967, lawmakers are their supporters routinely 
called laws that banned interracial sex and marriage ‘anti-miscegenation’ 
laws; they did so in order to signal their belief that sex and marriage 
between people of different races was a distinctly different phenomenon 
than sex and marriage between people of the same race.[…] I will use 
‘miscegenation’ to mark that particular racist belief […]. 
By using the term ‘white supremacy,’ I hope to suggest that the 
concept of whiteness carried vexed meaning, not just for Whites and 
Blacks but for all the groups […] despite wide differences in their 
individual racial formations and specific structures of oppression. […] 
Finally, to show the pervasiveness of racial categories then and now, I 
have departed from the usual grammatical practice and decided to 
capitalize the words ‘Black’ and ‘White’ as well as more routinely 
capitalized words […]. My hope here is to show ‘Black’ Americans as a 
group of men and women with a wide variety of skin colors and 
backgrounds rather than to let the word ‘black’ slide into physical 
description. And by capitalizing ‘White,’ I hope to help mark the category 
that so often remains unmarked, and taken for the norm, when the fact is 
that, in American history, to be ‘White’ is often an aspiration as well as an 
entitlement.
1
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1
 Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in 
America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13-14. 
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In embracing her ideology, I incorporated my own viewpoint and decided to use certain 
terms rather than others, and to use grammar to indicate a particular viewpoint. For the 
ease of the reader, this forward was created with the intention of explaining my 
terminology, as was the appendix included at the end of my thesis, defining certain terms 
used throughout my paper. 
To logically advance my overall argument, my thesis is divided into three 
chapters. Each chapter focuses on a single court case and the socio-political 
circumstances surrounding that case. Beyond the primary case, other court cases or social 
movements that contribute to the understanding of the primary case will be included in 
the chapter. The chapters are organized chronologically to show progressive change over 
time regarding race relations and interracial marriage in the United States. Similarly, 
while each chapter will focus on the over-arching issue of interracial marriage and racial 
tensions in American society, each of the chapters will also bring interrelated social and 
political issues to light, specific to the timing and social climate surrounding that case. 
! "!
"We don't do interracial weddings" – Beth Bardwell, 2009
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
THE NEW PECULIAR INSTITUTION 
In October 2009, Beth Humphrey and Terence McKay of Hammond, Louisiana 
applied for a marriage license. The marriage license was granted by the parish court 
clerk, yet the local justice of the peace, Keith Bardwell, refused to perform the wedding 
ceremony or to sign the license, thereby refusing to validate their marriage. Why had the 
couple been refused? Beth Humphrey is White and Terence McKay is Black. When 
interviewed by the press about his decision to refuse the couple, Bardwell defended his 
actions, and admitted that he did not approve of interracial marriages because he feared 
for the welfare of any children that might be born from such a union.
2
 Meanwhile, both 
the national press and government officials in Louisiana denounced Bardwell’s actions as 
archaic and reminiscent of a time when interracial marriage was illegal in the United 
States. By November, Keith Bardwell had resigned and faced a federal discrimination 
lawsuit. The uproar over the 2009 Bardwell incident demonstrates the longevity of racism 
in American society, and the importance of the institution of marriage to individuals and 
the state. Racism, specifically racist attitudes directed against Blacks by Whites, has been 
displayed in various forms since the founding of the United States and the arrival of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 “Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns,” CNN, 3 November 2009, 
accessed 20 September 2012, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage/; hereafter referred to as 
“Louisiana Justice,” 2012. 
2
 “Louisiana Justice,” 2012; “Interracial Couple Denied Marriage License By Louisiana Justice of 
the Peace,” Huffington Post, 18 March 2010, accessed 25 September 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/15/interracial-couple-denied_n_322784.html; “JP 
Refuses to Marry Couple,” Hammondstar.com, 15 October 2009, accessed 25 September 2012, 
http://www.hammondstar.com/articles/2009/10/15/top_stories/8847.txt. 
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first African slaves in the 17
th
 century. Yet none of the institutionalized representations of 
racism lasted as long as the legal barriers against interracial marriage. 
As an integral part of American society, marriage has a special standing in the 
United States. Socially, financially, and institutionally, the marriage union is given 
special status and grants spouses unique privileges, such as tax benefits, and certain 
financial and medical rights. Due to this immense importance, local communities, states, 
and the federal government have regulated marriage closely. In the quest for the 
preservation of the elusive “traditional marriage” – a lasting marriage between one man 
and one woman from similar backgrounds and social standing – legal barriers were 
created to ban certain people from joining together in marriage.
3
 However, this idea of a 
traditional marriage is flawed since the institution of marriage is constantly evolving.  
The progressive legal changes made to the definition of marriage, and to the availability 
of marriage to different forms of couples, indicates this evolution over time. 
 Most historians who study marriage agree that marriage has a progressive history: 
first becoming an institution subject to formal regulation, then given a recognized 
definition, and finally being restructured multiple times in order to suit the given social 
climate. In the words of historian Elizabeth Abbott, “As the cultural and political 
meanings of marriage evolve, public policy incorporates them into new laws and 
regulations,” meaning that what a “marriage” actually is depends on the time, place, and 
people involved.
4
 In this thesis I refer to three historians– Elizabeth Abbott, Nancy Cott, 
and Stephanie Coontz – all of whom have written on the evolution of marriage in general, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3
 Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History: How love conquered marriage (New York, NY: 
Penguin Group, 2005), 1-11; hereafter referred to as Marriage, A History. 
4
 Abbott, Elizabeth. A History of Marriage (Toronto, Canada: Penguin Group, 2010), 379; 
hereafter referred to as A History of Marriage. 
! "!
and an additional historian – Peggy Pascoe – who has written specifically on the 
intersection of race and marriage in the United States.
 
At the core of their arguments, all 
four historians agree that the institution of marriage is not stoic; marriage is a social and 
political right that is constantly subject to change. 
There have been numerous forms of marriage over the centuries, each with 
varying levels of social endorsement and state regulation. In ancient Greece, the 
community commonly accepted homosexual relationships so long as the couple 
conformed to gender norms, with one man, usually the younger of the two, assuming the 
feminine role.
5
 In many nations, polygamous marriage has been widespread and socially 
accepted; for a time, even the early Mormon community in the United States practiced 
polygamy, albeit not with state sanction.
 6
 However, the U.S. government quickly 
demonized homosexuality and polygamy, outlawing these forms of marriage in favor of 
heterosexual, singular marriage. Bans against homosexuality or sodomy came to the U.S. 
from 16
th
 century English law, while polygamy was formally outlawed in 1862 with the 
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act and the 1882 Edmunds Act.
7
 Common-law marriage was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 Abbott, A History of Marriage, 269. 
6
 Abbott, A History of Marriage, 23-24; Coontz, Marriage, A History, 60. 
7
 According to the Edmunds Act, which outlawed polygamy, “every person who has a husband or 
wife living who, in a Territory or other place over which the United States have exclusive 
jurisdiction, hereafter marries another, whether married or single, and any man who hereafter 
simultaneously, or on the same day, marries more than one woman, in a Territory or other place 
over which the Uniteei [sic] States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of polygamy, and shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for a term of not 
more than five years” Information from: “The Edmunds Act,” Bancroft Library, Internet Archive, 
2007, accessed 18 February 
2013,http://www.archive.org/stream/edmundsactreport00unitrich/edmundsactreport00unitrich_dj
vu.txt; To summarize, “the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of 1862 prohibited polygamy in the 
territories. It also limited the value of the land that the LDS church could own, among other 
things.” Information from: “1852-1890: Opposition to LDS Church's Practice of Polygamy,” 
Utah State History, Utah.gov, 2013, accessed 18 February 2013, 
http://www.ilovehistory.utah.gov/time/stories/polygamy.html. 
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socially accepted in many nations, including the United States, until the late 1900s, and 
was often considered to be a legally valid marriage after a certain number of years.
 8
  
What is colloquially referred to as “living in sin,” or a couple sharing a residence in the 
absence of formal marriage, has evolved from common-law marriage and, although it 
lacks legal recognition, has gained extensive social acceptance in the past few decades.
9
 
Despite some restrictions, the overall institution of marriage, meaning the social 
importance placed on the marriage contract, endured. More and more, the institution of 
marriage became regulated by the state, as evidenced by the formal outlawing of 
homosexual marriage, polygamy, and interracial marriage by either the state or federal 
government. 
Possibly the most enduring and state sanctioned structure of marriage is 
patrimony. For centuries, laws have favored the husband over the wife, and relegated 
wives to the status of property within marriages. Many women were subjected to the 
physical abuse of their husbands, and reduced to almost entire dependence upon men for 
financial support. For example, until 1974, women in the United States were not able to 
have a credit card in their name without a male cosigner.
10
 Beyond financial oppression, 
women also had difficulty gaining parental rights over their own children in the case of 
separation or divorce.
11
 Most women faced significant stigmatization if they did not 
marry, but became the property of their husband if they did.
12
 These women were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
 Abbott, A History of Marriage, 66. 
9
 Coontz, Marriage, A History, 271-272, 279. See Appendix C. 
10
 “NFCC Examines History of Women and Credit,” Nation Foundation for Credit Counseling, 
accessed 20 September 2012, 
http://www.nfcc.org/consumer_tools/consumertips/womencredit.cfm. 
11
 Abbott, A History of Marriage, 213-218. 
12
 Coontz, Marriage, A History, 187. 
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subjected to the physical, financial, and sexual whims of their husbands, and were largely 
unprotected by the law. It was not until the 20
th
 century that women in the United States 
began gaining rights, legally equivalent to those of men. 
Historians, such as Stephanie Coontz and Elizabeth Abbott, have attempted to 
chronicle the past and present development to the institution of marriage. One of the 
topics discussed in-depth in American marriage history is the significance of interracial 
marriage. In general, the examination of interracial marriage is sociopolitical, with 
sociologists and political scientists writing on the topic alongside historians. However, 
this is not to suggest that research ignores the historical components inherent in the study 
of interracial marriage. Rather, history is incorporated into the research done by most 
authors who write on the legalization of interracial marriage. Besides the history of the 
court cases, legislation, and individuals involved in interracial marriages, another 
important aspect to consider in examining interracial marriage history is the social 
context. This is an especially important factor to include when discussing interracial 
marriage in the United States, which has a notorious reputation for intense and enduring 
racism and racial tension in society. 
I propose that the most noteworthy transformation undergone by the institution of 
marriage in the past 50 years is the legalization of interracial marriage; I exclusively 
examine Black-White marriage because this form of interracial marriage was subject to 
the longest lasting and most stringent miscegenation laws. Miscegenation laws date back 
to the importation of the first African slaves to the colonies, even before the American 
Revolution or the formation of the United States of America.
13
 As property, slaves were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
 Abbot, A History of Marriage, 333; Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 20. 
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not entitled to have their marriages recognized by the state or their owners. Often, slaves 
would conduct their own marriage ceremonies, which were not legally binding and went 
largely ignored. Likewise, slave owners had the right to sell slaves at any time, regardless 
of their familial status, which often separated husbands from wives and children from 
parents. However, since the child’s status of “slave” was inherited through the mother, 
White slave owners tended to encourage sex between slaves because any children 
produced, whether through relations between slaves or between White slave owners and 
female slaves, became property of the slave owner.
14
 The power structure of slave society 
basically guaranteed White slave owners sexual access to their female slaves without the 
need for consent or the fear of punishment. Interracial relationships in this era often 
began when White men took sexual advantage of Black women.
15
 Thus, sex was 
encouraged while marriage went unrecognized. 
Miscegenation (sometimes referred to as anti-miscegenation), a term coined in 
1863 to refer to interracial marriage, became widespread in the Reconstruction era as a 
conservative reaction to the new freedom of African Americans and as a way to preserve 
the racially based social hierarchy.
16
 Miscegenation laws prohibited the marriage of 
Whites to members of various racial and ethnic groups. These laws were formed on the 
legal presumption that race can be quantified. Most states that enacted miscegenation 
laws based legislation on a percentage of non-White ancestry. At the most extreme, states 
based race on the “one drop rule,” which deemed every individual with any Black 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14
 Peggy Pascoe, What Come Naturally: Miscegenation law and the making of race in America 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 25-26; hereafter referred to as What Comes Naturally. 
15
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 12, 31-32, 177; Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and 
the Nation (U.S.A.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 35, 58; hereafter referred to as Public Vows. 
16
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 27-31. 
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ancestry whatsoever to be racially and legally classified as African American.
17
 Some 
liberal states would allow an individual to have up to 1/8
th
 of non-White heritage and still 
be considered White, but anyone with 1/8
th
 or more of non-White blood was 
automatically classified as a member of the race most predominant in their ancestry.
18
 
Many states also enacted miscegenation laws broad enough to prevent marriage between 
any White and anyone who was not also classified as White, including banning marriages 
between Whites and “Ethiopian or black race, Malay or brown race, Mongolian or yellow 
race, or the American Indian or red race.”
19
 At one time, at least 30 states had 
miscegenation laws, with higher estimates reaching close to 40 states, and in 1967 
thirteen states still had such laws enacted.
20
 
The general prohibition against interracial relationships came from a social 
stigmatization of interracial sex due to a fear of race mixing. This fear centered on 
maintaining the purity of the White race by protecting White women from what was 
deemed to be the sexually deviant Black male population.
21
 White men could engage in 
sexual relations with Black female slaves since the children would be illegitimate, and 
because any children produced followed the mother’s bloodline and were classified as 
Black and, therefore, as slaves.
22
 Yet, in the case of a White woman and Black man, any 
children produced through their union would legally be considered Black, but would not 
automatically become slaves since the mother would be a free White. Thus, this would 
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17
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 116-123. 
18
 Cott, Public Vows, 43. 
19
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 91. 
20
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 118; Douglas Martin, “Mildred Loving, Who Battled Ban on 
Mixed-Race Marriage, Dies at 68,” The New York Times, 6 May 2008. 
21
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 86. 
22
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 26-27. 
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create free Blacks, which the White population feared.
23
 This gendered sexual inequity 
was largely based on the entitlement of White men in the United States through the 
consolidation of all political and social power in their hands, but was also due to the 
sexualization of interracial relationships.
24
 
According to Peggy Pascoe, all interracial relationships, regardless of the actual 
level of commitment between the couple, were classified as sexual relationships, devoid 
of commitment, social approval, or legal sanction.
25
 By sexualizing all interracial 
relationships, the state could demean the importance of the relationship and withhold 
state recognition.
26
 Miscegenation laws reinforced the sexualization of interracial 
relationships by forcing all interracial couples into the category of fornication, or illegal 
sexual fraternization. This stigma was often increased by the stigmatization of engaging 
in coitus outside of marriage, since marriage was not a right extended to interracial 
couples. Thus, every interracial couple faced legal repercussions and social shaming due 
to the mere existence of their relationship. 
 It was only with the rise of the Civil Rights Movement that interracial couples 
began to challenge miscegenation laws in courts across the nation, all the way up to the 
United States Supreme Court. The social setting after World War II created a general 
awareness among Americans of the inequality and racism inherent in miscegenation law. 
Beginning with the Asian “war-brides” American soldiers brought back to the states and 
extending to the returning Black soldiers with girlfriends or fiancées of another race, 
miscegenation laws were slowly being challenged by calls for equality in the realm of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 51-54. 
24
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 24-27. 
25
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 12, 86. 
26
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 12. 
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marriage.
 27
 Once organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) endorsed the 
fight to overturn miscegenation laws, there was little to stop the progression toward a 
federal overturning of intermarriage bans. 
The legislation associated with interracial marriage provides insight into the 
historical, social, and legal context of the miscegenation debate, as well as providing a 
framework for the temporal process of legalization. Although the social opinions of 
interracial marriage were vastly important, the strength of the argument for legalization 
rests with the law. Cott, Coontz and Pascoe imply that the majority of the legal debate 
over interracial marriage has to do with wording and intent within the U.S. Constitution, 
specifically, the 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments of the Constitution.
28
 These amendments 
guarantee due process and equal protection respectively, as well as full faith and credit.
29
 
Another key component of the 14
th
 Amendment is the extension of citizenship rights to 
African Americans, who had previously been denied formal citizenship. In fact, the 5
th
 
and 14
th
 Amendments, in combination with specific legal issues each case also introduced 
and along with equal application of the law, were used in every miscegenation case 
discussed in this thesis as legal reasoning to overturn the prohibition on intermarriage. 
My thesis goes further, showing that legislation was progressively enacted to attain 
equality under the law for African Americans, and that this legislation was a consequence 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 206. 
28
 “5
th
 Amendment,” Cornell University Law School, accessed 12 September 2012, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amendment; 
“14
th
 Amendment,” Cornell University Law School, accessed 12 September 2012, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv.http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters
/constitution_amendments_11-27.html. See Appendix A. 
29
 Full faith and credit implies supra-state recognition of public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings. 
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of the precedent set by the 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments, as well as from precedent set by 
each successive miscegenation trial. 
Elizabeth Abbott, in A History of Marriage, and Stephanie Coontz, in Marriage, a 
History, both examine the history of the institution of marriage from the 17
th
 century to 
the present. Coontz questions the entire use of the term “traditional” in regard to 
marriage, arguing that what is assumed to be a traditional marriage never truly existed 
since marriage is constantly subject to social and legal changes.  Abbott approaches 
marriage from a multinational and social perspective, arguing that there is no single 
definition of marriage, or a true “traditional” form of marriage, since marriage laws and 
requirements change from one society to the next. In Public Vows: A History of Marriage 
and the Nation, Nancy Cott studies marriage from an American social perspective, and 
discusses the ways in which society and the government have both protected and 
infringed upon the institution of marriage, all in the name of uniformity. In her book, 
What Comes Naturally, Peggy Pascoe discusses the history of marriage in regard to 
interracial marriage, approaching the topic from a socio-legal perspective by discussing 
the social conditions surrounding each successive piece of legislation in the realm of 
miscegenation.  
Abbott, Coontz – and to some extent Pascoe and Cott – state that marriage is a 
constantly evolving institution. Pascoe advanced the argument further by stating that 
miscegenation was an example of the transformative nature of marriage, and was also a 
sexualization of race. Pascoe showed that much of the reasoning behind bans on 
intermarriage stemmed from a fear of the White community towards, and an aversion to, 
interracial sex. While I agree with these historians, especially in regard to their 
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conclusion that marriage is always changing, and that there is no true “traditional” 
marriage or a suitable singular definition, I see interracial marriage as a pivotal 
transformation to not only the institution of marriage, but also the American social and 
legal conceptions of marriage, race, and sexuality. 
I am building on this historiography in five key ways. I argue that: the legalization 
of interracial marriage was representative of the liberalization of American society, 
intermarriage could have only been legalized at that specific historical time, legal 
precedent was one of the key factors in the decision to legalize interracial marriage, bans 
on intermarriage were created and maintained to preserve the social power of White 
males, and that the legalization of intermarriage has set a precedent for the legalization of 
same-sex marriage today.  I complicate these ideas by introducing a new perspective on 
how interracial marriage has changed the institution of marriage by focusing on the 
precise legal precedent it utilized to legalize intermarriage, and the precedent it 
established in regard to same-sex marriage. Similarly, I elucidate that interracial marriage 
could only have been legalized at a particular historical moment, once American society 
was ready for the accompanying transformation to the former definition of marriage, and 
once the law had progressed to a point that made overturning miscegenation legally 
feasible. In this way, I demonstrate that there could not have been a legalization of 
interracial marriage if there had not been a concurrent liberalization of American society. 
Interracial marriage demonstrates how social and legal forces intersect to defy the 
notion of a “traditional” marriage, thereby transforming and redefining the institution. 
The combination of social and legal factors resulted in alterations to, the institution of 
marriage, namely the legalization and recognition of interracial marriages. The specific 
! "#!
legal precedents established throughout the interracial marriage debate, particularly the 
legal significance of Pace v. Alabama and Perez v. Sharp, and the precise social timing of 
Loving v. Virginia in 1967 enabled the legalization of interracial marriage and established 
precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage today. 
In order to show the progressive nature of marriage since 1883, I examine the 
legalization process for interracial, specifically Black-White, marriage through three 
specific court cases, all of which advanced the right to marry, regardless of race. These 
cases demonstrate how both the law and the definition of marriage can be transformed 
due to the democratic process and concurrent changes in social perception. Each case 
marks a discrete point of change in the socio-political climate regarding marriage. In 
these moments, law and society interact to question the legal standing of interracial 
marriage, and the result of each case indicates a significant change in the perception and 
definition of the institution of marriage. 
The three case studies presented in my thesis will be Pace v. Alabama (1883), 
Perez v Sharp (1948), and Loving v. Virginia (1967). While previous historians, like 
Pascoe and Cott, have discussed these three cases in relation to the history of marriage, 
my assessment looks at each case individually, as discrete points in time in which the 
definition of marriage was challenged and changed. It also examines how all three ceases 
interacted and built off of one another to ultimately transform the legal definition of 
marriage in the United States. By looking at the cases from this perspective, I highlight 
the legalities of the interracial marriage debate, such as precedent and constitutional 
rights, while also looking at the influence a progressive liberalization of American 
society had on the legalization process. All three cases present formal challenges to what 
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was the accepted definition of marriage, and each also demonstrates the evolution of that 
definition over time. 
Chapter one examines the case of Pace v. Alabama.
 30
  This case was decided by 
the United States Supreme Court in 1883 and found that the ban on interracial marriage 
was not unconstitutional since both individuals in the proposed union, White and Black, 
were equally affected. Due to the ban limiting marriage for both races, according to the 
court, miscegenation laws were not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution. Pace v. Alabama also established that marital sex between 
Blacks and Whites was a felony, whereas extramarital sex between the two was only a 
misdemeanor. This discrepancy reaffirmed that, while any racial mixing was viewed 
negatively, interracial marriage was viewed as a threat to the institution of marriage and 
to the White race particularly. This case shows the initiation of the transformation of 
marriage because, although the court found in favor of miscegenation laws, the fact that 
the case was even presented to the court indicates that interracial marriage was a pressing 
social issue as early as the post-emancipation era. This chapter will address the case brief 
of Pace v. Alabama and will also discuss the distinction between interracial sex and 
interracial marriage, which illustrates the underlying social significance of the institution 
of marriage to Americans. 
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 Chapter two focuses on Perez v. Sharp (1948), which reversed the decision of 
Pace v. Alabama at the state level.
31
 Perez declared that bans on interracial marriage 
violated the 14
th
 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and therefore could not be legally 
be enacted. However, the Supreme Court of California, rather than the United States 
Supreme Court, decided this case, and thus the decision was only applicable in the state 
of California, stressing the difference between state and federal law. Despite this case 
being decided at the state level, it set a precedent for the legalization of interracial 
marriage in other states, and for eventual federal legalization. This chapter also discusses 
the introduction of new legal arguments since Perez, unlike previous miscegenation 
cases, utilized the argument that prohibiting marriage violated the 1
st
 Amendment right to 
freely practice religion as well as violating the 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments. Finally, this 
chapter highlights that interracial marriage was largely a Black-White marriage debate, 
since Andrea Perez was not, technically, White and, therefore, her marriage did not pose 
as great of a threat to White social supremacy. 
Chapter three centers on the decisive case in the process of legalization for 
interracial marriage – Loving v. Virginia (1967).
32
 The decision of Loving v. Virginia 
recognized the fundamental right to marriage for all, regardless of race or sex. The idea 
of marriage as a fundamental right led to the unanimous Unites States Supreme Court 
decision (9:0) in favor of removing all miscegenation laws, across state lines, thereby 
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legalizing interracial marriage at the federal level. A key component of Loving was the 
time period. The social climate of the 1960s, in a reflective post-war and active an Civil 
Rights Movement fervor, favored the legalization of interracial marriage, and many 
people in the United States viewed legislative action like the Loving case to be a crucial 
step towards racial and social equality. This chapter discuss the social forces that enabled 
the overturning of miscegenation as well as the legal reasoning used, and especially 
emphasizes that both were products of the culmination of past social events and legal 
cases. 
To confirm that marriage is constantly evolving, I present the same-sex marriage 
debate as the present day equivalency to the interracial marriage debate. Due to the 
comparative qualities shared by these two legal battles, my epilogue will focus on the 
first known case of a same-sex marriage, that of Jack Baker and Michael McConnell 
(1971), and on the case Baehr v. Miike (1999; also known as Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) 
which was the first same-sex marriage case to reach the United States Supreme Court. 
The debate over the legalization of same-sex marriage currently taking place mirrors the 
historical debate surrounding interracial marriage in many ways. There are many legal 
barriers and social stigmas attached to same-sex marriage, much like the arguments 
against interracial marriage that were used in the past. The same-sex marriage debate also 
shows the continuing transformation of the institution of marriage when subjected to 
social and legal pressure. Yesterday’s battle was interracial marriage, the right to marry 
whomever we choose, regardless of the socio-political stigma; today’s battle is same-sex 
marriage, which, yet again, questions the right to marry whomever we choose, regardless 
of the socio-political stigma. The legalization of interracial marriage established a 
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precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage, and the social climate today seems to 
favor federal legalization of same-sex marriage, much as it did for interracial marriage in 
1967.  
Marriage has a unique standing in American society, which results in more 
intensive and longer-lasting state regulation. The underlying purpose of this regulation 
was to ensure that all marriages performed by the state were also sanctioned by the state. 
The role of the state in regulating and defining marriage was slowly established as 
communal bonds gave way to centralized government. The development of state 
regulation led to the necessity of legally defining “marriage,” and eventually led to the 
debate over the legality of interracial marriages. Until the late 20
th
 century, most states 
did not sanction interracial marriage on the premises of maintaining racial purity and 
preventing the procreation of mixed race children.
33
 The interplay of the importance of 
the institution of marriage and aggressive racism led to the creation of formal bans on 
intermarriage beginning in the Reconstruction era, and the persistence of miscegenation 
laws in the United States until the 1960s.  
In reality, marriage is not stable; the notion of a “traditional” marriage is flawed 
from conception in the sense that there is no one single form of marriage that has 
subsisted without reforms; the legal structure and social significance of marriage have 
always been open to legislative reform and social interpretation. Interracial marriage is 
one example of how the institution of marriage has changed over time, but it is an 
example that encompasses critical American social and legal reasoning. In this thesis, by 
examining the socio-political significance of interracial marriage in the United States, I 
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will trace the transformation of the federal definition and the social conception of 
marriage, beginning in 1883 with the U.S. Supreme Court case Pace v. Alabama and 
ending in 1967 with the federal legalization of intermarriage. Although Pace did not 
bring about a change to the legal standing of interracial marriage, and, in fact, became the 
precedent used to maintain miscegenation bans, it was an early challenge to 
miscegenation law and indicated that there was a social need for a reexamination of 
interracial marriage law, effectively instigating the legalization process for intermarriage, 
eventually culminating in Loving v. Virginia. 
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“The framework of miscegenation laws had grown so strong that its 
constitutionality was assured and its naturalness assumed.”
1
 
 
 “The Pace decision crowned the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the post-war 
judicial defense of miscegenation law. […] judicial avoidance of civil rights claims was 
made easier by the fact that it was Black men and White women […] who stood before 
the court.”
2
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
SEXUALIZING MISCEGENATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
In 1881, Tony Pace and Mary Cox, both residents of Grove Hill, Alabama, were 
arrested for violating an Alabama statute prohibiting interracial fornication and 
cohabitation. During their trials, the prosecution rested on testimonies of White 
neighbors, likely the same individuals who reported Pace and Cox to the authorities in the 
first place. Pace’s attorney originally attempted to argue that the state needed to prove 
Pace and Cox were living together, rather than having occasional sex, since the statute 
was limited to prohibiting cohabitation. Pace’s attorney wanted the jury to be aware of 
the limitations of the statute, since it restricted the charges the defendants could be tried 
for, but the court overlooked this legal stipulation.
3
 Both Pace, an African American man, 
and Cox, a White woman, were found guilty of “living in fornication and adultery,” and 
sentenced to two years imprisonment.
 4
 They were sentenced in two separate trials, and 
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both faced more serious charges than same-race couples accused of the same crime.
5
 
However, Pace went on to appeal his conviction on the grounds that the Alabama 
prohibition on interracial cohabitation and marriage was unconstitutional.  
After the initial trial in Grove Hill, Pace’s case was taken on by John Tompkins, a 
White attorney, who worked the case pro bono and largely financed Pace’s state and 
federal appeals himself. Tompkins, after an anticipated loss at the state level, began his 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Possibly the most unique facet of the Pace trial, in 
regard to miscegenation law, is that Tompkins never challenged Alabama’s right to ban 
interracial marriage. Rather than challenge miscegenation, which specified marriage, 
Tompkins argued that the state violated the equal protection clause through its unequal 
punishment depending on the racial composition of the couple.
6
 Tompkins did not 
directly challenge Alabama law, conceding that the state had the right to ban interracial 
marriage and to arrest people who committed fornication and adultery outside of 
marriage, but he did propose that the state law violated the 14
th
 Amendment due to the 
inequitable punishment, dependent on race, for the same crime. 
The legal argument in Pace centered on the inequitable application of the law. 
The fact that miscegenation laws did not allow interracial couples to marry forced any 
interracial couple in Alabama to live in a state of fornication, rather than in a state-
recognized marriage union. The Alabama miscegenation  
Code declares that ‘if any White person and any negro, or the descendent 
of any negro to the third generation, inclusive, though one ancestor of each 
generation was a White person, intermarry or live in adultery or 
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fornication with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be 
imprisoned in the penitentiary or sentenced to hard labor for the county for 
not less than nor more than seven years.
7
 
This legislation allowed for someone with 1/8
th
 or less Black ancestry to marry someone 
White, but barred anyone with more than 1/8
th
 Black ancestry from marrying anyone with 
less than 1/8
th
 Black blood. Those couples falling outside of these measurements were not 
allowed to marry, and were thus relegated to the status of living in fornication. 
Within the issue of fornication, Tompkins argued that Alabama’s miscegenation 
laws violated the 14
th
 Amendment of the United States Constitution in regard to equal 
protection of the laws. According to Tompkins, the law inequitably punished interracial 
couples for a crime many same-race couples committed. 
The statue of Alabama provides that ‘if any man and woman live together 
in adultery and fornication, each of them’ shall be liable to a specified 
punishment. Another statute provides a greater punishment to each one ‘if 
any White person and any Negro intermarry or live in adultery or 
fornication with each other.’
8
 
The clear difference in punishment prescribed for the same crime - living together in 
adultery or fornication - depending on the racial composition of the couple, either same 
race or interracial, was at the core of Tompkins defense. If a difference based solely on 
race existed, then the statute violated the 14
th
 Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
could not legally be enforced, thereby granting recognition to the cohabitation and 
common-law marriage of Pace and Cox. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, however, ruled to uphold the convictions, and stated 
that Alabama’s miscegenation laws did not violate the 14
th
 Amendment because the law 
equally applied to both races. Following a “separate but equal” ideology, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated: “Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in 
the two sections is directed against the offense designated and not against the person of 
any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether White or 
Black, is the same.”
9
 Since both Cox, who was White, and Pace, who was Black, were 
punished equally, the U.S. Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and ruled that 
each race was being treated equally. The court decided that the difference in punishment 
rested, not on the race of the individuals, but on the difference in the crimes committed – 
one simply being adultery or fornication, the other being interracial adultery or 
fornication. The fact that these were two separate crimes attests to the inherent racism in 
law; since the dominant social group was White and they controlled the political and 
legal structures of 19
th
 century America, a crime was deemed to be worse when it 
involved a mixed race couple. 
Until the mid 20
th
 century, racial classifications were based socially on an 
individual’s skin color, and legally on an individual’s blood composition. Race was 
determined by how much non-White ancestry someone had, or their racial blood 
composition. Having 1/8th non-White ancestry was the high end for the amount of non-
White blood someone could have before they were legally classified as belonging to a 
race other than White. In the most conservative states, the “one-drop” rule was 
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enforced.
10
 In these states, a person who had any non-White ancestry whatsoever could 
not be legally considered White.
11
 Most miscegenation laws were based on this blood 
measurement principle. Even though there was no empirical way to measure someone’s 
racial ancestry through blood composition, this pseudo-scientific standard was applied in 
order to “prove” someone’s race. By the 1/8
th
 rule, a person needed to have only one 
great-grandparent who was Black to be legally classified as Black. This principle, and the 
theory of being able to measure someone’s race through blood composition, became 
incredibly important since the American social structure was largely based on race, and 
being able to classify oneself as White, rather than Black, ensured huge socio-legal 
benefits. 
Moreover, some people who had more than 1/8
th
 non-White ancestry were able to 
“pass” as White in society based solely on their skin color, even though they would 
legally be considered to be of color.
12
 Passing happened more often than was recognized 
by many Americans. It was not rare for lighter skinned African Americas to pass as 
White men and women, which led to the realization that skin color is not a reliable 
measure of ancestry. Regardless of the inaccuracy of this measurement standard, social 
distinctions were made, fist and foremost, on the basis of skin tone. British professor J.W. 
Gregory noted that, “Colour is often used as if it were the essential racial distinction, as it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
 “Important Law Decisions: Mixed marriages at the South,” New York Times, 9 July 1877. 
(hereafter referred to as “Important Law Decisions.”); “Sentences for miscegenation,” New York 
Times, 28 February 1884; Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 120-122. 
11
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 142. 
12
 “White Man is Held as Negro,” Los Angeles Times, 13 June 1922; “Important Law Decisions,” 
1877. 
! "#!
is easily observed; but it is so variable that it is not an adequate criterion of race.”
13
 
Simply appearing to be White or Black did not accurately predict the actual racial 
heritage of an individual. Passing was a serious concern for the White community, 
especially in regard to marriage.
14
 If society could not distinguish between the races, then 
racial mixing through interracial marriage was bound to occur. This fear drove many 
people to accuse others of being Black, and led states to create laws that closely defined 
race and to create procedures for identifying non-Whites. Race became legally entirely 
dependent on ancestry. Publically, race was still defined primarily by skin color. 
However, individual racial identification was not considered a valid measure of race, 
meaning that even if someone identified as a member of the White community, if they 
had 1/8
th
 Black blood, they were Black. These laws ranged from one-drop to 1/8
th
 Black 
ancestry, in more lenient states, to classify individuals according to race. Regardless of 
the impracticality and unscientific basis of the blood measurement principle or of 
judgments based on skin color alone, numerous states created laws based on these 
classifications and applied these laws to marriage. Some states simplified their laws by 
barring all non-Whites from marrying Whites, while other states created laundry lists of 
the specific races that could not marry Whites. Either way, between 1913 and 1948, 30 
out of the then 48 states in the U.S. had banned marriage between Whites and Blacks (to 
varying degrees of racial ancestry).
15
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Blood measurements of race were instigated primarily to clarify miscegenation 
laws, and miscegenation laws were created to prevent racial mixing. The need to regulate 
marriage to prevent racial mixing “made racial classification seem to be imperative – that 
is, in order to determine who could and couldn’t marry, it was first necessary to identify 
every person’s race quickly and correctly.”
16
 The idea of corrupting White racial purity 
was central to the reasoning behind miscegenation law.
17
 In order to prevent racial 
mixing or the corruption of White racial purity, states used blanket bans on interracial 
marriages based on racial blood measurements, like those mentioned above. 
Mixed race individuals became the grey area of miscegenation law. Because they 
could be classified as White, they could not marry anyone who was non-White, but 
because they could also be considered Black, they could not marry anyone who was 
White; effectively, the laws barred mixed race individuals from getting married.
18
 This 
was an example of the inequity in application of the law that Tompkins strove to 
overturn. Although the classification of Pace’s race was never questioned, nor was that of 
Cox, their sentences were indicative of the ingrained racial inequality still present in law, 
despite the supposed equality of citizens. The effective exclusion of mixed race 
individuals from legal marriage and the structural purpose of miscegenation laws to 
maintain a social hierarchy favoring Whites while simultaneously disadvantaging Blacks 
were, Tompkins argued, constitutional violations, specifically violations of the 5
th
 and 
14
th
 Amendments. 
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The 14
th
 Amendment granted citizenship to former slaves, and also guarantees 
due process and equal protection of the law. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.
19
 
The Equal Protection Clause, contained within the 14
th
 Amendment, requires each state 
to guarantee equal protection of the laws to all citizens living within its jurisdiction. 
In other words, the laws of a state must treat an individual in the same 
manner as others in similar conditions and circumstances. […] The equal 
protection clause is not intended to provide "equality" among individuals 
or classes but only "equal application" of the laws. The result, therefore, of 
a law is not relevant so long as there is no discrimination in its application. 
In the Reconstruction era, this clause was primarily used to overturn legislation that had 
previously maintained the sub-citizen status of Blacks. Equal protection came to be 
commonly regarded as “equal application,” meaning that each law should equally apply 
to all citizens, regardless of race. However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not see this 
clause extending far enough to cover the right to marry for interracial couples, since, they 
believed, miscegenation law was equally applied to both Blacks and Whites, even in the 
Alabama statute. 
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However, the exact intentions of the Equal Protection Clause were unclear. 
Although the Supreme Court ruled that the 14
th
 Amendment was not being violated by 
Alabama’s miscegenation statute, even the Pace decision acknowledged that the Equal 
Protection Clause was meant to ensure that there was no discrimination in punishment 
among citizens. 
Equality of protection under the laws implies not only accessibility by 
each one, whatever his race, on the same terms with others to the courts of 
the country for the security of his person and property, but that in the 
administration of criminal justice he shall not be subjected, for the same 
offence, to any greater or different punishment.
20
 
A liberal interpretation of the 14
th
 Amendment supported Tompkins’ argument that laws 
such as Alabama’s miscegenation statute did violate the civil rights of American citizens. 
The application of this principle should have resulted in an overturning of miscegenation 
legislation, but the Supreme Court was not willing to introduce, and the American public 
was not yet willing to accept, the radical concept of interracial marriage openly applied at 
the federal level. 
The 5
th
 Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to due 
process.
21
 Due process is essentially the concept of fundamental fairness, which means 
due process is violated if a practice goes against some fundamental principle of justice 
that is ingrained in society and tradition. In the case of Pace, Tompkins suggested that 
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miscegenation violated the American principle of equality for all citizens. Traditionally, 
the United States had not had equality between the races, but the idea of equality, in 
itself, is an essential component of American society. Given the granting of equal 
citizenship to Blacks in the 14
th
 Amendment, logically the 5
th
 Amendment would then 
guarantee due process and the principle of fundamental fairness to Blacks as well as 
Whites.  
Legally, Tompkins presented a compelling case in favor of Pace. According to the 
14
th
 Amendment, Pace had full citizenship rights, and could not be denied equal 
protection of the law. Under this equal protection, the government was required to apply 
all laws equally, meaning that any law applied to Pace, in his prosecution or his defense, 
must also be applicable to all other citizens, White and Black. Both due process and equal 
protection also stipulated that Pace must receive a fair trial, and that his punishment could 
not differ from that of others accused of the same crime. Bearing all of these legal 
provisions in mind, Pace’s arrest and sentence violated both his 14
th
 and 5
th
 Amendment 
rights. Unfortunately for Pace, it was the perspective of the Supreme Court that the 
punishment of Cox, a White woman accused of the same crime, satisfactorily showed 
that his constitutional rights were not being violated. Despite all of the legal reasoning, 
social norms outweighed Pace’s constitutional rights, leading to the Court’s decision 
against him. 
Alabama state law banned both fornication and cohabitation without formal 
marriage. These laws applied to all residents of Alabama, regardless of race, yet were 
widely ignored and unenforced. It seems that the occasions when cohabitation laws were 
enforced were instances like that of Pace and Cox - when White racial purity was 
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threatened - that police intervened.
22
 To have any Black ancestry decreased an 
individual’s social standing and limited their legal rights. Moreover, White women were 
viewed as the property of White men, and were idealized as the vessels of White racial 
purity.
23
 If the purity of White women was socially questioned, then the racial ancestry of 
any White man or woman could be questioned. Thus, any White woman with a Black 
man posed a threat to the entire racial purity of White America through the creation of 
mixed race children, free Blacks, and the sexual access of Black men to White women. 
For White America, mixed-race individuals posed a threat to social order. If 
mixed children existed, this suggested that either White men or White women, or both, 
were accepting African Americans as their social equals and possible sexual or marital 
partners. Similarly, the existence of biracial children blurred the racial division between 
Black and White, metaphorically and literally blending the races together into one social 
group. To a certain degree, mixed children of White men were overlooked because White 
male privilege ensured sexual access for White men to women of all races. However, 
when White women were involved with Black men, or when White men attempted to 
legitimate their relationship with a Black woman, community or family members 
intervened to prohibit such unions and the prevent the possible production of mixed race 
children.
24
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When Pace v. Alabama reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Tompkins argued that 
Alabama’s miscegenation law violated the 14
th
 Amendment of the Constitution because it 
did not equally protect African Americans’ right to marry.
25
 The U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that Alabama’s law was constitutional because it applied the law equally to both 
races – Whites could not marry Blacks and Blacks could not marry Whites.
26
 However, 
the court failed to see the distinction that Blacks were not equally protected. When states 
enacted miscegenation law, usually the marriages between Whites and Blacks that had 
previously been performed were not immediately voided in the eyes of the state. 
However, the state could now prosecute these couples for illegal cohabitation, as was the 
case for Tony Pace and Mary Cox. Nonetheless, many states did invalidate interracial 
marriages performed before miscegenation law was enacted.
27
 Miscegenation laws were 
only enforced to ensure the maintenance of a racial hierarchy privileging Whites, and the 
classification system used to define who was too Black to be considered White was 
created solely to ensure racial purity.
28
 
The society in which Pace and Cox were arrested was not conducive to 
overturning their convictions. The South in the post-Civil War era was particularly wary 
of any challenge to the supremacy of Whites. Reconstruction introduced many new laws 
into Southern states, promoting the rights and freedom of former slaves. Changes in the 
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legal codes prompted Whites to fear that there would be a shift in the social hierarchy, 
and led to a fear of interracial sex in particular. This panic over interracial sex stemmed 
from the belief that Black men were likely to pursue White women, who would then give 
birth to mixed-race children. These children, neither White nor Black, would not be 
accepted by either race and would become outcasts who lacked social standing and 
threatened proper social order.
29
 It was also a fear that White women, if allowed, would 
accept Black husbands, and that White men would legitimate relationships with Black 
women by taking them as wives, thereby allowing White society to accept African 
Americans as their social equals.
30
 To preserve their place at the top of the social 
hierarchy, Whites instigated laws, such as those created to ban interracial marriage. These 
laws served, in particular, to preserve racial purity and protect White women from Black 
men, who were portrayed as hyper-sexualized through the sensationalized White media.
31
 
Much of the liberal view of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries was characterized 
by dismissal. Many people simply dismissed interracial marriage as being so infrequent 
and inadvisable as to not pose any threat to racial purity. It was believed that the men of 
each race largely preferred the women of their respective race more so than those of any 
other race. However, it was also generally accepted that the religious, cultural, and social 
differences between Whites and Blacks led to unpleasant and disadvantageous marriages, 
so much so that these marriages were too rare to be paid any attention to. Yet, if an 
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interracial marriage transpired, despite all advice against it, the marriage was “not to be 
tolerated.”
32
 
Many Whites, especially White men, so vehemently and violently opposed 
interracial relationships, that they took it upon themselves to enforce miscegenation 
statutes. In 1885 in South Carolina, White men sought out interracial couples and mixed 
families, and systematically whipped and beat them until they agreed to leave the area or 
end their relationship. The regulators attacked primarily White men and women who 
were consorting with Blacks, both White women living openly with Black men and 
White men with Black mistresses. According to the New York Times, this renegade band 
attacked an estimated ten families in a matter of weeks, and defended their actions by 
stating that the government was ineffective at prohibiting such violations of social norm 
and law.
33
 This demonstrated the public opposition to interracial relationships, especially 
in the South. 
There were two overarching social reasons to uphold miscegenation law: sexual 
access and interracial offspring. The concept of sexual access was broken down into 
access for White men to Black women, and the protection of White women from Black 
men. According to the Chicago Defender, “Negro women are considered to be the 
legitimate prey of White men, and there is nothing said about it or nothing done to 
prevent it.”
34
 White men, even after the abolition of slavery, had little fear of being 
reprimanded for having sexual relations with Black women. Because of the lack of social 
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and political power held by Blacks, and Black women in particular, White men also had 
little to no fear of punishment for aggressive sexual acts perpetrated against Black 
women. “[It] has always been a common divertissement for White men to make 
conquests of poor and friendless colored girls,” and these conquests were chiefly made 
possible through inequity in the law regarding civil rights, such as the right to marry.
 35
 
Those with liberal social outlooks, or conservative family values, suggested that, 
“Marriage is in itself a contract between individuals of whatever race, and […] it would 
be far better to have it protected by the laws […] than to have the promiscuous 
cohabitation of the races.”
36
 Yet, besides maintaining the desired monopoly on sexual 
access, White men also faced social stigma if they attempted to legitimize their 
relationship with a Black woman. In a case in 1930, a Virginia police sergeant and his 
Black wife faced legal ramifications. When Sergeant Emil E. Umlauf attempted to 
legitimize his relationship with a Black woman through marriage, both he and his wife, 
although acquitted of formal charges, were forced to leave their home county or face new 
indictments.
37
 While White men valued their sexual access to Black women, society did 
not accept the formal recognition or legitimization of such unions through marriage. In 
his sentencing, the judge told Umlauf, “‘it was a mistake nature to endow you with the 
greater advantage and outlook that it gives to a White man,’” and reportedly reduced 
Umlauf to tears.
 38
 Overall, White men were hesitant to relinquish their sexual access to 
minority women, but they were even more reluctant to the possibility of Black men 
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gaining sexual access to White women, and therefore upheld the social norm of 
prohibiting all interracial marriages. If blanket bans on interracial marriage occasionally 
resulted in denying a White man his right to marry, as in the case of Umlauf, White 
society viewed this as a very small sacrifice in order to preserve racial purity and social 
order. 
Another instance of White resistance to interracial relationships was that of the 
infamous African American boxer, Jack Johnson. Johnson was a well-respected boxer in 
spite of his race; Johnson was both idolized and resented by Black boxers, and was both 
respected as an athlete and trivialized as an exception by White boxers. Once he had 
established a name for himself in boxing, he was able to challenge White fighters, and, as 
many of the prominent White fighters of the time did, to refuse to box with fellow Black 
men.
39
 However, Johnson generated anger among White Americans for two reasons: his 
prowess in the ring showed the ability of Blacks to defeat Whites, and because he 
notoriously associated with White women. In order to challenge Johnson’s rising social 
status and his boxing victories, White American scandalized his relationships, claiming 
he was a polygamist and that he violated the law by marrying a White woman.
40
 These 
accusations were serious enough to initiate legal action against Johnson, despite his social 
prominence and wealth, demonstrating to the Black community that no amount of fame 
or affluence could shelter those who decided to engage in interracial relationships. 
The second aspect of social concern, the children produced through interracial 
unions, was both feared and stigmatized by White society. To overcome this threat, two 
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concepts were introduced to discourage interracial procreation. The first was the idea that 
these children would be inherently inferior to pure-race children. In 1931, it was 
suggested that, “When they are markedly dissimilar [in the case of interracial 
relationships] the progeny are usually handicapped by some deficiency.”
41
 Scientific data 
circulated in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries reported that mixed-race offspring were 
mentally and physically inferior to children produced through same race procreation. In 
the case of interracial individuals who were markedly superior to those of pure racial 
ancestry, social scientists explained away these anomalies by stating that, “The mothers 
of the United States mulattos have been chosen, generation after generation, from the 
most attractive and intelligent Negro women; and the high quality of their children is the 
result of a long process of sexual selection.”
42
 This ideology also reflects the sexual 
exploitation by White men of Black women, and entirely disregards the possibility that 
some interracial children are the product of sexual encounters between Black men and 
White women. 
The other issue of social concern regarding interracial children was the stigma 
such children would face in society. “[The] illegitimate child of White and colored 
parents is the butt of special discrimination by both the Negro and the White castes.”
43
 It 
was suggested, and often true, that the offspring of interracial couples were not accepted 
by White nor Black society. This social stigma, and the harsh realities of being Black in 
White America led some mixed race individuals to attempt to pass as White in society. 
However, other mixed race individuals chose to renounce their White heritage in order to 
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more closely identify with Black culture. Due to the supposedly unhealthy and socially 
unacceptable children produced through interracial unions, the law and society seemed to 
agree that, “intermarriage between the […] human races should be avoided as far as 
possible.”
44
 
The constitutionality of miscegenation legislation was challenged from the 
introduction of such legislation in the late 19
th
 century, and affected many interracial 
couples.
45
 Although Pace v. Alabama upheld the status quo, it was a landmark case for 
the legalization process of interracial marriage. Pace quickly became the case cited 
across the nation whenever miscegenation laws were challenged. By referencing the 5
th
 
and 14
th
 Amendments, Pace changed the focus of miscegenation from race to citizenship 
rights. Whether intended or not, Tompkins initiated the use of constitutional rights to 
overturn miscegenation legislation. Although he argued against unequal punishment of 
interracial sex, rather than directly challenging the legality of miscegenation, Tompkins’ 
rationale came to be regarded as the most noteworthy challenge to miscegenation law 
until 1948. While Pace served as the precedent for upholding miscegenation law, it was 
also the earliest and most significant challenge to miscegenation law at the federal level. 
Eventually, Pace came to be viewed as a symbolic warning of how constitutional rights 
can be disregarded in the case of race. This case also presented a formal challenge to the 
Reconstruction era definition of marriage, suggesting that interracial marriage should be 
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regarded in the way intraracial marriage was, and advanced the idea that marriage is a 
right of citizens that cannot be granted or denied on the basis of race. 
“Where interracial marriage has been prohibited by law as in many States in the United 
States the laws are based on social and political grounds.”
 46
 
 
“[…] the demon of prejudice of the White race against the Negro has manifested 
itself.”
47
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“Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of one’s 
choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from marrying a member of a race other 
than his own restricts the scope of his choice and thereby restricts his right to marry.”
1
 
 
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone 
has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”
2
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND RACIAL EQUALITY IN MARRIAGE 
 
Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis met while working in the defense industry in 
Los Angeles in the 1940s. They fell in love and decided to get married.
3
 When Perez told 
her family of the impending nuptials, her father stopped speaking to her; this was only the 
beginning of the challenges, both social and legal, the couple faced.
 4
 Despite friends and 
family members on both sides attempting to talk the couple out of marriage, Perez and 
Davis persisted and, in 1947, went to obtain a marriage license. Under the legal code in 
place in California in 1947, marriage license applications required each applicant to state 
their race. At the time, Hispanic Americans were grouped into the racial category of 
“White.” Therefore, on their application, Perez listed her race as White and Davis listed 
his as Black. However, under California state law, Perez, a White woman, could not 
marry Davis, a Black man. While Perez did not consider herself to be White, the law and 
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society, including Perez’s father, classified her as White, and limited her marriage 
options accordingly. 
Across the U.S., ancestry was traced in nearly every court case of interracial 
marriage to prove whether the accused was innocent, White enough, or guilty, being of a 
non-White race, and California was no different.
5
 In California in 1948, the legal code 
banned marriages between Whites and “negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay 
race, or mulattoes,” and even required that every marriage license list the race of both 
spouses.
 6
 The case of Perez and Davis came down to questions of race. Was Perez 
White? Was Perez non-White? Could she legally marry Davis, a Black man? Unlike 
previous cases, however, the court was not questioning the racial composition of the 
couple – Perez admitted she was Hispanic American and Davis admitted he was Black – 
only the legal classifications of race were under question. It came down to a question of 
whether Hispanic Americans should be considered White, barring Perez from marrying 
Davis, or if they should be placed in a separate racial category, opening new marriage 
opportunities. 
One of the primary reasons for the creation and preservation of miscegenation law 
was the institution of slavery. Prohibiting state-sanctioned marriages between Whites and 
Blacks preserved the racial hierarchy necessary to enforce slavery.
7
 Yet these laws 
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continued to function even after slavery and the Jim Crow era had ended, and even 
existed in states like California, with no history of slavery. Under California’s legal code, 
Perez and Davis were not eligible for a marriage license.  
State miscegenation law permits White persons to marry only other 
Whites, and defines the term: ‘Persons of the White or Caucasian race 
who have no ascertainable trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, 
Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in their veins.’
8
 
Definitions like this barred many couples from marrying, not just Perez and Davis. At the 
time, California was one of 30 states (out of the total 48 states that comprised the United 
States in 1948) that had some form of miscegenation law in place.
9
 Depending on the 
state, “The definition of ‘Negro’ in these laws ranges from ‘one-fourth or more Negro 
blood’ to ‘persons with any trace of Negro blood whatsoever.’”
 10
 The lack of clarity on 
who was considered non-White, and the tendencies of these classifications to alter 
according to state laws, created confusion in society regarding who could and could not 
marry, and limited the rights of those individuals who wished to marry interracially. 
However, post World War II society was vastly different than that of the Pace era, 
and even different from 20
th
 century American society before the on-set of the war. War 
brought social change through the equalizing role of the soldier.
11
 Both Black and White 
men fought in the military and, although this did not erase racial distinction, it lessened 
the ability of White Americans to demean Americans of other racial groups, since they 
had served the country side by side. Moreover, the atrocities of genocide perpetrated by 
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the Nazis in the name of Aryan (in other words, White) purity were viewed as a result of 
racial and ethnic discrimination, and became a symbol of what Americans should strive 
to avoid. In America after Hitler, calls for racial purity were no longer acceptable, 
stripping miscegenation laws of much of their previous reasoning.
12
 
Beyond the war, America was facing great social transformation through the Civil 
Rights Movement. Developing in the early 20
th
 century and beginning to dramatically 
expand in the late 1950s, the Civil Rights Movement built off of ideas of equality 
generated in the aftermath of warfare and grievous human rights violations, and the Civil 
Rights Movement particularly crusaded for equal rights for African Americans. Coming 
out of World War II, the United States had become acutely aware of the terrible 
consequences of racism, evidenced by the Holocaust. Given this horrendous example, 
American society had to reassess its social structure and the inequities in all areas of life: 
economic, political, legal, and social, that African Americans faced simply due to their 
race and the underlying White supremacy of the nation. This reassessment came to 
fruition through the Civil Rights Movement, which began with a rational and peaceful, 
yet powerful, push by the African American community for equality, but grew to 
encompass both Black and White participants.
13
 The Civil Rights Movement was, like 
Perez v. Sharp, a product of post-WWII society, but it was also evidence of the changing 
social perspective towards race relations in the United States. 
One of the organizations that became renowned for working for social reform was 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The 
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NAACP officially began in 1909 under the leadership of Black intellectuals such as 
W.E.B. DuBois. At first, the NAACP was hesitant to join the crusade to end 
miscegenation laws since previous efforts to overturn miscegenation laws had failed (i.e. 
Pace v. Alabama) and because the NAACP saw need for reform in other areas as more 
critical than ending miscegenation, such as ending segregation in American schools.
14
 In 
the end, the NAACP decided not to involve itself in the Perez case. However, there were 
other organizations involved in the campaign to end miscegenation, such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which often worked alongside the NAACP in civil rights 
cases.
15
 The NAACP was primarily concerned with overcoming racial barriers in areas 
other than marriage, for example the desegregation of schools, while the ACLU was 
active in challenging existing miscegenation laws.
16
 It was in the post-war climate that 
these organizations, among others, decided to grasp the liberalizing social attitude and 
harness its drive in order to, yet again, challenge the legality of miscegenation law. 
On October 1, 1948, the California Supreme Court declared that miscegenation 
law was unconstitutional because it violated the 14
th
 Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In the Perez decision, the court split into two opinions that, although 
concurring, were based on separate legal arguments for validating interracial marriage. 
The first opinion was based on the same argument that had been proposed in Pace: that 
miscegenation laws violated the principles of due process and equal protection under the 
14
th
 Amendment. The second opinion was directed against miscegenation laws on the 
basis that such laws violated the principle of religious freedom, covered under the 1
st
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Amendment of the Constitution. Regardless of reasoning, both decisions agreed that 
miscegenation law was unconstitutional, effectively outlawing miscegenation legislation 
for the entire state of California. 
Despite the fact that Perez was legally White and therefore – according to 
California law – could not marry Davis, there were two extenuating circumstances to 
Pace v. Sharp that prompted the court to rule in favor of Perez and Davis. The first of 
these was the use of the argument for religious freedom by Marshall. One of the founding 
principles of America was the right to religious freedom, which has traditionally been a 
widely valued and closely protected right. Within the Constitution, “two clauses in the 
First Amendment guarantee freedom of religion. […] The free exercise clause prohibits 
the government, in most instances, from interfering with a person's practice of their 
religion.”
17
 The case of Perez and Davis was unique from previous miscegenation cases 
because they were both Catholic, and had already received sanction for their marriage 
from their church before applying for a marriage license. While planning their wedding, 
Perez and Davis decided to hold their ceremony at their local church, St. Patrick’s 
Catholic Church.
18
 It was in this setting that they approached a fellow parishioner and 
attorney, Dan Marshall, who also oversaw the Catholic Interracial Council, for help in 
obtaining a marriage license.
19
 
Unlike previous lawyers who had attempted to overturn miscegenation legislation, 
Marshall approached the Perez case from a freedom of religion standpoint. Realizing that 
citing violations of the 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments alone would not be enough to overturn 
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California’s statute against interracial marriage, as indicated by Pace v. Alabama, 
Marshall expanded his argument to include a 1
st
 Amendment violation. Perez and Davis 
wanted to practice the Catholic sacrament of marriage, and the state of California was 
prohibiting them from freely practicing their religion through the enforcement of 
miscegenation legislation. Marshall argued that by prohibiting their marriage the state 
was actively denying both Perez and Davis the right to freely practice the sacrament of 
marriage, fundamental to their faith. In effect, Marshall argued that California’s 
miscegenation law was unconstitutional because it violated the 1
st
 Amendment right to 
free practice of religion. 
The race of Andrea Perez and Sylvester Davis was the second circumstance that 
differed from previous miscegenation cases. Technically, neither Perez nor Davis was 
White. Perez, although legally classified as White, was actually Hispanic. Many members 
of the Hispanic population agreed with this classification since it awarded them certain 
social and political privileges denied to other minorities, but, in this case, it actually 
restricted Perez’s rights. Miscegenation laws were originally intended to keep the White 
race pure through the protection of White women; because Perez was not White, the 
extent to which the White community felt the need to enforce miscegenation in her case 
was not as strong as it might have been had she been a non-Hispanic White. A reduced 
perceived threat to the White race may have contributed to the court finding in favor of 
Perez and Davis. 
As was the case in the Pace decision, the decision of the California Supreme 
Court in Perez v. Sharp exemplified the influence society has over the law. In the years 
between Pace and Perez, Americans largely viewed interracial marriage as “‘inadvisable 
! ""!
on social and cultural grounds.’”
20
 Although racial mixing continued to be viewed as 
unnatural, White men still enjoyed unrestricted sexual access to both women of both 
races, outside of the formal state sanction of marriage, while Black men faced 
persecution if they consorted with White women.
21
 The legislation in place reflected the 
social values of White America, particularly of White men; these values were embodied 
in the legalized segregation of many American schools, the socialized segregation of the 
suburbs, also known as “White flight,” and the romantic segregation of the races that was 
enforced through miscegenation legislation. According to a sociological journal article 
published in 1958, “whether or not this system of segregated living is expressed in 
legislation, it is public sentiment which gives meaning to, and which enforces, the 
system,”
22
 and public sentiment, until Perez v. Sharp, ultimately appeared to oppose 
interracial marriage. 
The social timing of the Perez case was determinative of the outcome of the trial. 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, using race or ethnicity to differentiate 
between and legally segregate citizens generated unease due to the recently associated 
stigma of Nazism. Pre-World War II, individuals in an interracial couple often did not 
believe, or reported not to believe, that their partner had non-White ancestry.
23
 Post-
World War II, interracial couples more often reported not caring about the racial heritage 
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of their spouse; they simply wanted the right to marry.
24
 There was also a marked legal 
shift in the use of race in regard to marriage. Before World War II, race had often been 
used as a means to achieve a divorce. One or the other spouse simply had to claim that 
the other had non-White blood, and be able to show some evidence to support their claim, 
and their marriage was declared void. After World War II, couples often supported their 
partner, regardless of race, and sought legally recognized, state-sanctioned marriage, 
regardless of racial ancestry. Most of the post-war miscegenation cases were due to 
family members or neighbors reporting interracial couples that lived together or 
attempted to marry. It became increasingly rare for race to be used as a reason for 
divorce. 
In a 1947 survey conducted at Los Angeles City College, students reported 
varying degrees of acceptance towards interracial marriage. Responses ranged from 
outright rejection, to philosophical responses such as, “‘the cultural, religious, and social 
differences of the two races can’t be reconciled… miscegenation is impractical,’” all the 
way to admiration for the individuals who overcome social mores and decide to marry 
across racial boundaries.
 25
 One young woman stated, “‘It takes courage to set precedents 
[be the first to marry interracially] and I wouldn’t dare.’”
26
 The mere thought that 
interracial marriage, the most staunchly opposed threat to one of the most sacred social 
institutions in the United States, could be accepted was indicative of the progress society 
had made towards racial equality in the 65 years since Pace v. Alabama. 
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Perez v. Sharp was significant for two primary reasons. Perez was the first case in 
the 20
th
 century to overturn a miscegenation law on the basis that these laws violated 
constitutionally protected rights. This set a precedent for the invalidation of 
miscegenation laws across the nation. Of secondary importance was the distinction that 
Perez brought to light between state law and federal law. Although Perez had abolished 
miscegenation from the legal code of California, numerous other states continued to ban 
interracial marriage and society still deemed interracial relationships to be, for the most 
part, unacceptable.  
As indicated by Pace v. Alabama, “the United States courts have no jurisdiction 
over questions of marriage. The opinion [of the U.S. Circuit Court of Virginia] holds that 
the laws of marriage are at the sovereign control and will of each State, unaffected by any 
provision of any article of the Constitution of the United States.”
27
 This decision speaks 
to the assumed autonomy of each state, and their right to independently regulate 
marriage. Since there was no federal law on interracial marriage, states had the ability to 
create and enforce their own legislation on the matter. States very much valued the ability 
to regulate their own marriage laws, especially in the South, where miscegenation was 
used to maintain the racially based social hierarchy in the century following 
Reconstruction. This distinction between state and federal law was underscored in Perez 
v. Sharp since California overturned the state miscegenation statute, but there was no 
subsequent overturning of state miscegenation laws at the federal level. Thus, other states 
could continue to deny marriage licenses and prosecute interracial couples that violated 
miscegenation laws. The logic behind these bans was based on ”White supremacy. 
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Twenty-nine and a half [miscegenation being outlawed in only half of Colorado] states of 
the Union have laws forbidding the marriage of Whites with Negroes, or a certain degree 
of Negro strain.”
28
 Although California had outlawed bans on interracial marriages, other 
states, such as Virginia, still had miscegenation laws in place; America was not yet ready 
to uniformly accept interracial marriage. 
Another important aspect to note is that interracial marriage was so staunchly 
opposed that, “The State custom of honoring the laws of other States usually does not 
apply to miscegenation.”
29
 This means that some states would not even recognize 
interracial marriages that had been legally performed in another state, even though 
tradition dictated supra-state recognition of contracts made legally, like marriage, 
regardless of which state it had been executed in. This resistance on behalf of states to 
accept intermarriages demonstrates that the diverse national views had, thus far, made a 
uniform federal law on miscegenation impossible, but the changing social climate in the 
post-WWII era was more conducive to widespread social reform in regard to race 
relations, as indicated by Perez v. Sharp. 
Many of the states that still had miscegenation laws in place went so far as to 
include miscegenation legislation in the state constitution, thus effectively creating an 
enduring uniform ban throughout the state that would also serve to impede the process of 
overturning such laws, if they were challenged.
30
 Until 1949, approximately 30 states had 
miscegenation laws in place to prevent interracial marriages, and six of these states had 
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bans against interracial marriage written into their state constitutions.
31
 Yet, there was a 
growing impatience with the regulation of marriage by individual states. The confusion 
over who could and could not marry, where they could marry, and where their marriage 
would be legally recognized drove some people to call for a federal mandate on marriage. 
One such person, the influential Jamaican-American author, J.A. Rogers, stated, “I 
believe that every citizen who is not an outright moron will feel that America ought to 
have a uniform marriage and divorce law.”
32
 Such a law, yet to be created, would quell 
the confusion miscegenation legislation had dispersed throughout the nation. 
In California, even after the Perez decision, Rosamond Rice, the head of the Los 
Angeles County marriage license bureau and the official who had first refused to issue 
Perez and Davis a marriage license, continued to try to prevent interracial marriages. She 
persisted in having couples report their races on marriage licenses, as had been required 
by law before the Perez decision, in an attempt to deny licenses to interracial couples, 
even though such actions were now illegal.
33
 Although ultimately ineffective in 
eliminating interracial marriage, Rice was successful in rejecting some applicants before 
being forced to concede to California’s new law. Rice’s inability to accept the Perez 
decision illustrates the deeply rooted prejudice against interracial marriage, and the 
persistence of racism, even in light of social and legal reforms. 
Perez, although influential, was by no means a nationwide reform of interracial 
marriage. As of 1948, Mississippi had not recognized a single interracial marriage, and 
continued to convict interracial couples that did manage to marry. In the case of Davis 
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Knight, the charge of miscegenation managed to bring his race into question when 
nothing else had. Knight had served as a White man in the United States Navy during 
World War II, and had married a White woman. While the state listed Knight as a White 
man in his military service records and had accepted him as a White soldier, it refused to 
accept his marriage, which led to Knight being charges with violating miscegenation law. 
Knight’s trial largely focused on tracing his racial ancestry and determining the race of 
his great-grandmother, who was suggested to have been a “Negro,”
 
which would legally 
define Knight as Black.
34
 When it was decided that Knight’s great-grandmother had, in 
fact, been Black, Knight was found guilty, received a five-year sentence of incarceration 
in a state penitentiary, and his marriage was invalidated. 
Willie E. Purcell, a former member of the U.S. Army, had more luck when he was 
charged with miscegenation in 1949 in Virginia. Purcell was accused of being Black by 
his mother-in-law, who was displeased with his marriage to her daughter. Police 
dismissed the case upon receiving confirmation that he was White in the form of a birth 
certificate and his Army discharge papers.
35
 In another example of the persistence of 
miscegenation legislation in the nation, a White male resident of San Francisco was told 
in 1955, long after the Perez decision had been handed down, that if he married his 
fiancée, who was of Japanese descent, and then moved to Georgia, Georgia would not 
recognize his marriage as valid, even though it would have been legally performed in 
California.
36
 While this man, unlike Knight and Purcell, was not in the armed forces, he 
was a White male, supposedly a member of the highest social group, and was still 
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impeded in his effort to marry a non-White woman. In the cases of Knight and Purcell, 
the United States has accepted them as White men when they were volunteering their 
lives to the military, but, despite their service, these men were still persecuted once they 
attempted to marry White women. 
The prosecution of members of the U.S. armed forces, like Knight and Purcell, 
and, more generally, of White men involved in interracial relationships, demonstrates the 
extent to which the White population, overall and especially in the South, feared and 
despised interracial marriage. By 1954, the Atlanta Daily World noted, “the olny [sic] 
case where a miscegentic [sic] marriage has been held valid […] is a California case 
[Perez v. Sharp].”
37
 Even in the wake of Perez, roughly 30 states still had miscegenation 
laws in place, and each of these states denied the right to marry to interracial couples 
according to varying classifications of “Black” and “White”. Yet, Perez was a step 
forward in the evolution of marriage in regard to race. In effect, the Perez decision 
redefined marriage, creating a space for racial mixing in the realm of marriage, even if 
only at the state level. In a sense, Perez v. Sharp constructed a place for racial freedom, 
where anyone of any race could freely marry anyone of their choosing, without the 
concern that the state would deem their union invalid on the basis of race. However, it 
was gradually becoming clear that “‘you can’t legislate miscegenation. More tolerance 
will be required of people. Theoretically, it’s [interracial marriage is] the best way to 
break down prejudice.’”
38
 This student, quoted anonymously, gave an accurate 
assessment of the state of the nation in regard to interracial marriage. Changing the law, 
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alone, would not be enough to transform the nation; there must also be a corresponding 
change in the social conception of race and the opinion towards intermarriage to bring 
about a lasting change. 
The issue of interracial marriage was brought to the footsteps of the Supreme 
Court multiple times, and with an increasing frequency, between 1948 and 1967. Only 
months after the Supreme Court had ruled to desegregate schools in the landmark Brown 
v. Board of Education (1954) case, Linnie Jackson asked the Court to rule on her case.
39
 
Jackson was convicted of marrying a White man in Alabama and sentenced to a two-year 
prison term.
40
 However, both the Alabama Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court 
refused to hear her case. The federal government was not yet willing to overrule the 
states’ power on the issue of miscegenation. According to The Washington Post, “Court 
rulings to date have approved State miscegenation statutes. Federal courts have been 
most reluctant to rule on the subject. The closest the United States Supreme Court has 
come to ruling on the constitutionality of such laws was in Pace v. Alabama in 1882 
[sic].”
41
 However, by the end of the 1950s, popular opinion was favoring the right of 
individuals to choose who they want to marry. It became a commonly accepted notion 
that, “‘marriage is something more than a civil contract, subject to regulation by the state. 
It is a fundamental right of free men.’”
42
 This sentiment insinuated that citizens had a 
right to marry whomever they chose, without fearing state infringement on this right. 
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“[…] California has repealed its law. This is the first instance of repeal of a state law on 
miscegenation […].”
43
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“She is Negro, he is white, and they are married.”
1
 
 
“‘Tell the Court that I love my wife and it is just unfair that I can’t live with her in 
Virginia.’” – Richard Loving
2
 
 
“Loving v. Virginia may well become the next big landmark in civil rights.”
3
 
 
“race is constitutionally irrelevant”
4
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
WHERE LOVE AND SOCIAL CHANGE COLLIDE 
 
He was White, she was Black, and they were in love. Richard Loving and Mildred 
Jeter grew up in the same small town of Central Point in Caroline County, Virginia, a 
place that, unlike the majority of the South, generally overlooked interracial relationships 
due to the “easy-going tolerance on the race question.”
5
 Richard and Mildred kept 
company for almost a decade and were high school sweethearts who decided to marry in 
1958, once Mildred became pregnant. Mildred, unaware that she and Richard could not 
marry in Virginia due to her race, followed her fiancée to Washington, D.C., where 
Richard knew they could legally marry. Upon returning to Caroline County, the status of 
their relationship was no longer something that could be ignored by the community: a 
White man had married a Black woman, and this newly official union could not be 
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tolerated. Unbeknownst to the Lovings, someone in their community anonymously 
reported their recent nuptials to the authorities of Caroline County. 
In the middle of the night, the county sheriff and two deputies charged into the 
Loving’s home and entered their bedroom, demanding to know why the couple was 
sharing a bed. When Richard pointed to the marriage certificate hanging proudly on the 
wall and Mildred said, “I’m his wife,” Sheriff R. Garnett Brooks, simply stated that their 
marriage certificate was “no good here,” in Virginia. The Lovings were promptly 
arrested.
6
 Under the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, it was illegal for any White 
and non-White to marry, thereby invalidating the Loving’s marriage, even though it had 
been legally performed in Washington, D.C.
 7
  The Lovings faced persecution for both 
circumventing state law by traveling to D.C. to marry then returning to Caroline County 
to reside, and violating state law by living as man and wife.
8
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Although Richard was able to post his own bail, the Sheriff and the Caroline 
County court would not allow him to post bail for his pregnant wife, and Mildred was 
forced to spend several nights in jail before she could be released on bail.
9
 At their 
sentencing, a “local judge handed down a years’ sentence but suspended it if they agreed 
to leave the state immediately and stay away for 25 years,” and not return together to the 
state of Virginia.
10
 In, perhaps, the most notorious statement from the local trial, the 
judge who originally sentenced the Lovings, Leon M. Bazile, wrote in his 1958 decision, 
“‘Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red, and He placed 
them on separate continents, and but for the interference with His arrangement there 
would be no cause for such marriages.’”
11
 With this statement, the Lovings were forced 
to leave their extended family and hometown, effectively banished from the state of 
Virginia. 
The Lovings and their three children lived in Washington, D.C. for five years, 
visiting family in Virginia only occasionally. However, in 1963 the Lovings returned to 
Virginia together to visit Mildred’s family, and were promptly rearrested. Unlike their 
last sentence, which they had tacitly accepted, upon this arrest Mildred wrote to then-
Attorney General Robert Kennedy requesting assistance for their appeal; Kennedy 
directed Mildred to contact the ACLU, who agreed to work with the Lovings to contest 
their sentence. From the ACLU, Philip Hirschkop and Bernard Cohen agreed to represent 
Richard and Mildred. Hirschkop and Cohen, like previous miscegenation attorneys, 
decided to base their appeal on the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14
th
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Amendment; they began constructing a case arguing that the Loving’s protected civil 
rights had been violated by the state of Virginia.
12
 After their second arrest, Richard and 
Mildred could only continue living in Virginia under a temporary federal court order, 
which protected them from being arrested yet again while their case was argued in the 
Virginia state Supreme Court.
13
 Thus, the legality of the Loving’s marriage was put on 
trial; however, their appeal was quickly rejected at the state level and advanced to the 
federal Supreme Court. By 1966, the Loving v. Virginia trial and its impending decision 
were national news with The New York Times, The Washington Post, and LIFE Magazine 
covering the trial, and the entire nation was expecting a long awaited federal ruling on the 
legality of interracial marriage. 
In the historic Supreme Court decision in favor of upholding the Loving’s 
marriage, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, “‘There can be no doubt that restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of 
the equal protection clause.’”
14
 Going further, and stretching this decision to apply to all 
states, Warren stated in the majority opinion that: 
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival. […] To deny this fundamental freedom on so 
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these 
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the 14
th
 Amendment, is surely to deprive all the state’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law […] Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with 
the individual and cannot be infringed by the state.
15
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Interestingly, the Lovings later noted that they hadn’t experienced “any hostility in the 
community during their protracted court battle,” which had lasted almost a decade. The 
lack of active social sanctions against their legal struggle indicated that the staunch 
opposition to intermarriage which, in the past, would have resulted in threats, beatings, or 
even lynching was now being, more or less, accepted by society.
16
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court decision – best summarized by Warren’s statements recognizing the right to marry 
whomever one chooses, regardless of race, and acknowledging the racism inherent in 
miscegenation legislation – was also indicative of the growing social acceptance of 
interracial marriage. From their arrest in 1958 to the decision of their infamous trial in 
1968, the Lovings encountered little to no social hostility, and in 1968 the Loving’s 
desire and right to be married became legally recognized. In this sense, the Loving v. 
Virginia case perfectly represents the collision of social change and legal alterations 
necessary to finally overturn bans against interracial marriage. 
In the post-Pace and pre-Loving era, segregation of the races was largely upheld 
due to a fear that interaction between the races, especially at a young age, would promote 
interracial dating, sex, and marriage. This fear was exponentially increased with the 1954 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board, which desegregated American schools, 
thereby increasing interaction between the races.
17
 Desegregation of schools introduced 
young White men and women to young Black men and women, and there was a very 
strong threat perceived by White society that this increased interaction would result in 
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interracial friendships and increased interracial dating, particularly between White girls 
and Black boys.
18
 Despite this fear, schools were federally desegregated in 1954, 
indicating a liberalizing change in socio-racial attitudes.
19
 Thus, voting rights, civil rights, 
and education had all been brought to a level of equality, at least legally, overcoming 
long-established racial barriers.
20
 
However, legal and social reforms had not yet extended into the realm of 
interracial dating and marriage. Intermarriage was not often viewed as the most important 
right sought by Blacks, but it was a right that represented true social equality and the 
overcoming of long-standing social barriers that were based solely on race and the 
maintenance of White social power. The Dred Scott case of 1857
21
 acknowledged that, 
“this country’s attitude towards Negroes [is] indicated by the antimiscegenation statutes, 
which put ‘a stigma of the deepest degradation upon the whole [African American] 
race.’”
22
 This indicated that intermarriage was actually as important right for African 
Americans, since legalizing Black-White marriage would indicate that this “degradation” 
had been lifted. For White society, sex and marriage between the races still posed the 
greatest threat to the established social hierarchy, which placed White men in the 
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privileged social position, because of the resultant mixed race offspring and the social 
equality implied by interracial couples. As reported in the New York Times in 1964, “[the 
fear of interracial] sex is a fundamental factor in Southern racial attitudes,” and this 
persistent fear still posed the greatest hurdle in overcoming racial inequalities.
 23
 
There was a certain stigma associated with interracial marriage that cannot be 
understood without first examining the social structure which supported the continued 
dominance of White men in American society. Two issues central to this comprehension 
are the value of White purity and the subordination of women to men. These two 
concepts are best projected onto the issue of interracial marriage in the statement: “The 
White Southerner who thinks nothing of illicit intercourse with a Negro girl would rebel 
at the idea of marrying her. Sex is sex and caste is caste. … he [the White Southern man] 
is free to approach Negro women but a racial wall is built around white women.”
24
 
Published in the New York Times in 1964, this statement summarizes centuries-old 
established thought on how American society should be structured and maintained. The 
racial hierarchy of White over Black and the sexual hierarchy of men over women are 
both encompassed in this statement. The finer point is that White men feared the sexual 
power of Black men more than anything else.
25
 The sexual access of Black men to White 
women could corrupt the purity of White women and the White race as a whole, and also 
had the ability to produce biracial children. Mixed race children had the power to 
diminish the social hierarchy constructed by White men, since the racial dividing lines 
would become blurred by their very existence. In fact, it became widely recognized in the 
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1960s that “the truth is that only social disapproval really inhibits marriage between 
whites and Negroes now,” since race was, by this time, viewed as a socially constructed 
concept by part, although by no means all, of American society.
26
 
The South continued to oppose interracial marriage due to the “underlying fear of 
compulsory Federal equal rights laws,” which were viewed as imminent in the wake of 
legalizing interracial marriage.
27
 For many White Southerners, interracial fornication and 
marriage were the precursors to social equality, and, often, the terms were even used 
interchangeably.
28
 There was an underlying belief of Southern Whites that if the races 
were allowed to mix, fornicate, and marry, then there were no longer clear socio-racial 
distinctions between Blacks and Whites, therefore depriving Whites of their traditional 
social standing above Southern Blacks.
29
 However, confusion over the regulations 
surrounding interracial marriage in each state, whether banned or permitted, increased the 
demands for a uniform national policy on marriages between Blacks and Whites, one way 
or the other. Similarly, while racial distinctions existed in the North, especially de facto 
racial prejudice, the idea of socio-racial equality was not as deeply ingrained and there 
was even participation of White and Black Northerners in Civil Right Movement 
activities aimed at overturning racist legislation in the South.
30
 The South could no longer 
keep itself segregated from the rest of the nation, as indicated by the Brown v. Board 
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decision, and the national call for a federal ruling on interracial marriage was finally loud 
enough to drown out the objections of the South. 
According to the New York Times, in 1963, 19 states still banned interracial 
marriage.
31
 As suggested in 1948 by Perez v. Sharp, the Roman Catholic Church did not 
formally oppose interracial marriage. In principle, most organized religions defend the 
sanctity of marriage; the Roman Catholic Church includes marriage in the sacraments, 
sanctifying the union and encouraging all church members to marry. By 1963, the 
National Catholic Council for Interracial Justice stated that, “Interracial marriage is 
completely compatible with the doctrine and canon law of Roman Catholicism.”
32
 
According to the statement, “‘Races do not marry […] Nations do not marry. Classes do 
not marry. Only persons marry.’ […] the right to decide to marry and whom to marry 
resides with the individual […] and neither the family nor the state may abridge this 
right.”
33
 Thus, these 19 states based their persistent denunciation and rejection of 
interracial marriage on something other than religion, since no religion, not even the 
dominant Catholic and Christian religions in the United States, opposed intermarriage in 
doctrine. This removed two of the traditional arguments against interracial marriage: that 
God was against it, and that it was unnatural and immoral. If no established religion, 
outright and as a whole, opposed intermarriage, then there was little evidence left to 
support these arguments. 
The developing national view towards interracial marriage was reflected in the 
New York Times when the paper stated in 1963 that, “it is inevitable that interracial 
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marriages will become as acceptable as inter-faith marriages are today,” implying not 
only the legalization of intermarriage, but also the general acceptance of mixed race 
marriages by American society. The Times went even further, stating that the opposition 
to interracial marriage stemmed from “a ‘fiction of ethnic superiority … invented by the 
white Southerner’ because he feels threatened economically and physically,” but, even 
beyond that, White Southern men feared the loss of control over the female body and the 
loss of their location at the top of the social hierarchy.
 34
 This fear was clearly articulated 
by Anthony Lewis, a prominent liberal intellectual for the New York Times, when he 
reiterated in an article published in 1964 that: 
‘the whole system of segregation and discrimination’ is designed to 
prevent eventual interbreeding of the races. ‘Every single measure is 
defended as necessary to block ‘social equality’ which in its turn is held 
necessary to prevent intermarriage. … Sex becomes in this popular theory 
the principle around which the whole structure of segregation of the 
Negroes – down to disenfranchisement and denial of equal opportunities 
in the labor market – is organized.’
35
 
Nonetheless, the fear of socio-racial equality was not universal and the social current in 
1960s America was transformative: redefining gender norms and expectations, forming 
new social groups, and especially working towards a new construction of race relations. 
The legalization of Black-White marriages was considered by some American 
social reformers of the 1960s to be the most significant goal in the movement for racial 
equality. Since interracial sex and marriage evoked the most emotion in Whites, 
especially White Southerners, interracial marriage was the longest and most staunchly 
opposed step towards racial equality in the South.
 36
  It was suggested by Anthony Lewis 
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in The New York Times – and most likely accurate to state – that, “‘what white people 
really want is to keep the Negroes in a lower status. Intermarriage itself is resented 
because it would be a supreme indication of social equality.’”
37
 Due to the intense 
opposition to intermarriage, there had not been a significant, precedent establishing case 
of interracial marriage to reach the Supreme Court since Pace v. Alabama in 1883. For 
the most part, the U.S. Supreme Court simply refused to hear cases involving the 
question of interracial marriage. Simply put, the government wanted to ignore the issue. 
It was not until 1964 that a case involving an interracial couple in Florida managed to 
reach the Supreme Court, and, furthermore, indicated that attitudes towards interracial 
marriage were changing. According to the New York Times, “McLaughlin v. Florida, as 
the case is called, could indicate the answer to the basic question of a state’s 
constitutional power to make racial difference a factor in regulating sexual conduct.”
38
 
McLaughlin v. Florida quickly became the beacon of hope for a federal decision on the 
national question of interracial marriage. 
The story of this case centered on Connie Hoffman, a White woman, and Dewey 
McLaughlin, a Black man, who were arrested in 1962 for violating a Florida statute 
prohibiting interracial habitual cohabitation. Although Hoffman and McLaughlin were 
not formally married, they wanted to reside together without the infringement by the state 
on their living arrangement or sexual exploits.
39
 Florida law prohibited their cohabitation, 
formal marriage, and even impeded their ability to plead common law marriage, since 
that legal loophole was denied to interracial couples as well. Even though the court ruled 
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in favor of Hoffman and McLaughlin, stating that the Florida law was unequal and based 
solely on racial prejudice, the court refused to comment on the implicit implications for 
interracial marriage. Hence, the state of Florida had to allow McLaughlin and Hoffman to 
cohabitate, but the Supreme Court did not issue a statement on the legal status of 
interracial marriage, since only cohabitation, not marriage, had been an issue in the 
case.
40
 Nevertheless, McLaughlin v. Florida set an enormous precedent for the decision 
in Loving v. Virginia since, as was shown in the McLaughlin decision, the states could no 
longer “‘conceive of a valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for a state law 
which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal 
offence.’”
41
 Given this precedent, Loving v. Virginia was well set to address each social 
and legal reason that had been given to ban intermarriage in the past, and to provide legal 
reasoning as to why these arguments no longer proved valid. 
The first issue addressed in the Loving trial was, “whether the constitutional rights 
of the individual override the state’s right to control marriages under the state’s police 
powers.”
42
 Hirschkop and Cohen argued that the Constitutional rights guaranteed to all 
American citizens, particularly equal protection and due process contained within the 14
th
 
Amendment, were more influential than the right of the state to regulate marriage. Their 
defense centered on the argument that this state regulation inherently violated the civil 
rights of American citizens, namely African Americans, who wanted to marry 
interracially. In the Loving case, Justice Potter Stewart remarked that, “It is simply not 
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possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of 
an act depend upon the race of the actor,” and that, “the purpose of the equal protection 
clause is to guarantee that Negro citizens are treated the same as white citizens.”
43
 
Furthermore, during the trial, the state of Virginia “[contended] that, because its 
[Virginia’s] miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro 
participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial 
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race.” However, 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this reasoning because, according to the decision 
delivered by Chief Justice Warren, 
There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest 
solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. Over the years, this 
Court has consistently repudiated ‘distinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ Marriage is one of 
the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and 
survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as 
the racial classification embodied in these statutes, classifications so 
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 14
th
 
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the state’s citizens of liberty without 
due process of law. The 14
th
 Amendment requires that the freedom of 
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
44
 
Thus, in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the state of Virginia and in favor of 
an interracial couple, and implied that all anti-miscegenation laws across the country 
were unconstitutional.
45
 By legalizing interracial marriage, the court recognized, as 
suggested by The New York Times, that, “‘this whole system of segregation and 
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discrimination’ is designed to prevent eventual inbreeding of the races,”
 46
 rather than 
being based on any scientific, religious, rational or moral reason. Through Loving v. 
Virginia, the United States Supreme Court officially rejected the antiquated and 
inherently racist logic that had upheld miscegenation laws in the past. 
In 1966, even before the end of the trial, the Los Angeles Times published an 
article on the implications of the results of the Lovings versus the state of Virginia. In the 
article, the author, John Mackenzie, noted that the legislation being filed by the ACLU on 
behalf of Richard and Mildred Loving was broad enough to not only overturn 
miscegenation law in Virginia, but in the other 15 states with such legislation in place as 
well.
47
 Immediately after the Loving decision, the 15 other states with active 
miscegenation laws – Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Texas, and West Virginia – all faced the repercussions of a federal refutation of 
miscegenation, namely that they could no longer legally prohibit interracial couples from 
marrying.
48
 In 1967, one day after the Loving decision was handed down, then-State 
Attorney General Daniel McLeod recognized that this decision appeared “to knock South 
Carolina’s laws right off the books,” and that the miscegenation legislation in place in 
South Carolina would, in the absence of a test case, most likely remain in place, but 
would be unenforced. McLeod stated that the Loving decision would actually “help South 
Carolina in a way,” because this decision reduced the legal confusion around 
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intermarriage between Whites and Blacks, and, more generally, Whites and non-
Whites.
49
 
In the aftermath of the trial, statements, decisions, reactions, and implications of 
Loving v. Virginia were all the hype in national newspapers. The Plain Dealer of 
Cleveland, Ohio noted, one day after the conclusion of the trial, that “so explicit is the 
Constitution on the matter [of interracial marriage], it is surprising that the ban enforced 
by 16 states could have lasted as long as it did,” especially in light of the fact that the 
“14
th
 Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry must not be restricted by 
racial discriminations.”
50
 This article not only supported the Supreme Court’s decision, 
but also noted the irrationality that such laws had remained in place for as long as they 
had, and, furthermore, recognized that it was racial discrimination, not legal reasoning, 
that had created and maintained miscegenation legislation. In 1967, shortly after the 
Loving decision, the Evening Times of Trenton, New Jersey, noted that miscegenation 
laws were simply “relics of government-sponsored discrimination,” which were “harsh 
barrier[s] to the ‘pursuit of happiness’ promised in the Declaration of Independence.”
51
 
Although such an argument – that miscegenation violated the right to pursue happiness as 
guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence – was never used in court to overturn 
miscegenation law, the Evening Times makes a valid point which, when accompanied by 
the argument for freedom of choice in marriage, is a persuasive reason to keep the 
government out of the personal choice and rights of individual citizens in regard to 
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marriage.
52
 Meanwhile, The Washington Post remarked that the miscegenation law of 
Virginia had been “denounced as ‘white supremacy,’” by the Supreme Court and that the 
Lovings’ attorneys had labeled miscegenation legislation as: “‘slavery laws, pure and 
simple.’”
53
 So quickly had the public and legal tide turned in favor of interracial marriage 
and the right to marry whomever one loves, despite their race, that it becomes hard to 
recall that only moments before this decision nearly a third of the nation had outlawed 
such marriages. In the wake of Loving v. Virginia, it was possible to say that, “the legal 
foundations of racial discrimination in this country have been washed away in the 
Supreme Court,” and to believe it.
54
 Loving v. Virginia was the culmination of the Civil 
Rights Movement, the social liberalization undergone by Americans in the post WWII 
era, and the reflection of new social values through the law. 
The New York Times suggested that the Loving decision was simply Chief Justice 
Warren completing “the process that he set in motion with his opinion in 1954 that 
declared segregation in public schools to be unconstitutional.”
55
 The implication of this 
statement is that the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case initiated the 
federal push for racial equality in the Civil Rights era, and that Warren was instrumental 
in this egalitarian movement. The New York Times had immediately recognized the 
consequences of the wording used by Warren in Loving decision. Publishing an article 
the following day entitled “Justices Upset All Bans On Interracial Marriage: 9-to-0 
Decision Rules Out Virginia Law – 15 Other States Are Affected,” the Times noted that 
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the decision of the Supreme Court on June 12, 1967 effectively outlawed all bans on 
interracial marriages on a national scale, since “the wording [of the decision] was 
sufficiently broad and disapproving to leave no doubt that the antimiscegenation laws of 
15 other states are also now void.”
56
 As a result of Loving v. Virginia, interracial couples 
were able to legally marry in states that had banned such unions for hundreds of years. In 
many cases, the first few couples to marry in each of these predominantly Southern states 
were deemed newsworthy. Such stories began as early as the same month of the Loving 
decision and continued as late as the following decade, depending on the state.
57
 Thus, it 
appeared that Chief Justice Warren had accomplished his never stated but often assumed 
goal of bringing racial equality into U.S. law and putting it into action socially. 
Following the federal invalidation of anti-miscegenation legislation, some states 
began to work towards eradicating centuries-old laws based in racism. The most 
challenging hurdle to overcome was revising state constitutions for those states that had 
written miscegenation statutes into their state constitutions. Repealing a law was one 
thing, but having to pass a new amendment overturning a law that had been in place for 
decades, if not centuries, was an entirely different and much more challenging process. In 
Maryland, the effort to repeal a 300-year old law against intermarriage was challenged by 
a grassroots campaign. This campaign consisted of postcards being sent to the Maryland 
Senate with messages and signatures that “were purportedly those of pastors of Negro 
churches in each senator’s district,” who vocally opposed overturning the law. Messages 
contained traditional opposition reasoning, such as the message stating that interracial 
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marriage “‘is against God’s Will … it is EVIL.’” However, “Negro legislators said they 
had heard of none of the churches,” and Senator Royal Hart stated that these postcards 
were “‘obviously phony as hell,’” while Senator Verda Welcom said, “‘this was the work 
of a white man – we know who he is.’”
58
 Whether White or Black, amendment or not, the 
Loving decision had effectively invalidated Maryland’s miscegenation law, and all others, 
it was simply a matter of principle when it came to removing it from the state’s 
constitution. It was upholding this principle – that miscegenation was antiquated, racist, 
and illegal – in action and belief, that allowed for American society to come to accept 
interracial marriage as marriage, plain and simple. 
Remembered on the 45
th
 anniversary of the Loving decision, LIFE Magazine 
recognized the 1967 Supreme Court decision to be the moment that “codified the right of 
men and women to simply love whom they choose.”
59
 Due to the Loving decision, “the 
legal standard is freedom to associate,” regardless of race, and that standard has remained 
intact since 1967.
60
 “[At] one time or another 38 states had [antimiscegenation statutes]. 
All prohibited marriages between whites and Negroes,”
61
 by 1966 that number had 
dwindled to 16, and in 1967 the number was officially reduced to zero under federal law. 
The social climate and legal circumstances had, at long last, collided and profoundly 
reshaped American society in regard to race relations. Moreover, the law had finally 
caught up to a liberalizing concept of American race relations, and the faction of society 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58
 Richard Homan. “Marriage Law Repeal Passed By Md. Senate,” The Washington Post, 10 
February 1967. 
59
 “The Crime of Being Married,” 2012. 
60
 “Race, Sex And the Supreme Court,” 1964. 
61
 “The Law,” 1966. 
!"#!
outside of the norm was ultimately forced to comply with the majority or face legal 
repercussions. 
“The Supreme Court ruled unanimously today that states cannot outlaw marriages 
between whites and nonwhites.”
62
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CONCLUSION 
LOVE AND RACE IN A “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 
January 11, 1968, Memphis, Tennessee: 
“A licenses for an interracial marriage was issued today to James Edward 
Todd, a white sailor, and Floria Marquita Mayhorn, a Negro. […] 
Tennessee has issued only one other license for an interracial marriage 
since Reconstruction. That was last July, when Herman A. McDaniel, a 
Negro, and Joyce Prescott, a white woman, were married in Nashville. 
Their marriage was nullified two months later when McDaniel was jailed 
[…].”
1
 
In 103 years, Tennessee had only issued two marriage licenses to interracial couples, 
indicating the pervasive resistance to state recognition of intermarriage. 
August 3, 1970, Jackson, Mississippi: 
“A 24-year-old white civil rights law clerk and a young black woman from 
a poor rural south Mississippi county were married here today, toppling a 
legal barrier against interracial marriage that had been on the books for 
more than 100 years. It was believed to be the first such wedding in 
Mississippi.”
2
 
 
In this instance, the couple had to come “Armed with a marriage license issued two days 
ago under a Federal Court order,” in order to be granted their marriage in Mississippi 
because “the Southern National party, a segregationist group, [had] secured an injunction 
from a state judge in northern Mississippi barring issuance of the license to the couple, 
along with another interracial couple.” When the groom was interviewed, he stated that 
his marriage “was ‘not anything really different than what’s been happening for years in 
Mississippi. The only thing that is new is this is the first time the state of Mississippi has 
ever sanctioned it.”
3
 Even more telling of the Southern resistance to intermarriage, this 
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union, the first of its kind in Mississippi, didn’t occur for an additional two years after the 
Loving decision. 
December 10, 1970, Alabama: 
“The Justice department Thursday sued the State of Alabama and an 
Alabama judge who refused to issue a marriage license to a white Army 
Sergeant and a Negro woman. […] The action is the first time the 
government has ever attacked anti-miscegenation laws.”
4
 
By 1970, in the wake of federal legalization of interracial marriage, states could 
no longer get away with denying the right to marry to Black-White couples. Since 
the Loving decision, the federal government now had the legal recourse to sue the 
state or other individuals who attempted to deny interracial couples their right to 
marry. 
October, 2009, Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana: 
“Bardwell [Justice of the Peace] said he asks everyone who calls about 
marriage if they are a mixed race couple. If they are, he does not marry 
them […]. ‘I've been a justice of the peace for 34 years and I don't think 
I've mistreated anybody,’ Bardwell said. ‘I've made some mistakes, but 
you have to. I didn't tell this couple they couldn't get married. I just told 
them I wouldn't do it.’”
5
 
 
What these examples demonstrate are both the changes made to the institution of 
marriage and the opposition to these changes. Society progressed enough to reform the 
institution of marriage, thereby legally permitting interracial marriages. With the Loving 
decision in 1967, questions surrounding the legal status of intermarriage should have 
been settled. However, these quotes clearly show that interracial marriage was still 
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resisted by many Southern Whites, and that intermarriages were not, instantaneously, 
becoming more frequent.
6
 Immediately following the legalization of interracial marriage, 
the first few couples who were granted marriage licenses, especially in Southern states, 
were deemed news-worthy and announcements of their marriage were published in 
national newspapers, like the New York Times and Atlanta Daily World. The media 
frenzy surrounding interracial marriages that were performed in the immediate post-
Loving years indicate that these unions remained rare, as shown by the fact that in 
January of 1968, Tennessee had granted only two interracial marriage licenses, and in 
1970 Mississippi had still granted only one. 
A legal understanding of the legalization process for interracial marriage can only 
be understood through a comprehension of four key underlying issues: the law as written 
compared to legal interpretation, codified law versus social custom, state law versus 
federal law, and the importance of precedent. The social climate that allowed for a 
restructuring of the national legal code in regard to interracial marriage was distinct to the 
historical time periods in which each of the three cases discussed took place. Both the 
legal precedent and the social climate culminated into one final case, Loving v. Virginia, 
that came at the right time both socially and politically. 
 The law as written is much different than interpretations of the law. In many 
cases, past and present, arguments have been made for and against court cases based on a 
decision to either read the law as written or to apply an interpretation to the legal code. 
The debate between law as written and legal interpretation rests largely on the ideological 
debate over the intentions of the Founding Fathers when they wrote the legal codes, 
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particularly the Constitution and Bill of Rights. There are instances when people believe 
that the law should be upheld, as written, as well as instances when they will argue that 
the law is open to interpretation. Most likely, the law is interpretive; people can chose to 
read into the law things that may or may not actually be there. In the case of interracial 
marriage, legal interpretations were employed throughout the debate. The first 
interpretation, in Pace, argued that the founding fathers never envisioned interracial 
marriage as a realistic form of marriage, and it was, therefore, not protected in the same 
ways as intraracial marriages. Later, however, the law was interpreted as written, both in 
Perez and Loving, necessitating the legalization of interracial marriage, and the 
recognition of marriage as a protected civil right of American citizens, regardless of race. 
 Then there is the difference between codified law and social law. Even if 
something is codified – organized into a recognized system of rules – that does not mean 
that what is explicitly stated in the law is what is actually going to be recognized by and 
practiced in society. The best example of this discrepancy is de facto segregation and 
discrimination, such as White realtors only selling Black families homes in specific, 
predominantly Black, areas. This practice was socially recognized and tacitly accepted 
due to social conceptions of race, regardless of the technical legality of the actions of 
these realtors.
7
 In the case of interracial marriage, this difference is best exemplified by 
Rosamond Rice, who attempted to continue the socially accepted custom of denying 
interracial couples the right to marry despite the Perez decision, which had illegalized 
such actions in the state of California. 
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 Similarly, there is an important difference between state and federal law. States 
have, historically, had the power to create and enforce their own laws, but are 
simultaneously subject to federal mandates. This has created tension between those who 
support states’ right to regulate their own laws, and others who support having a singular, 
unified federal legal code that would apply to all 50 states. This was a crucial issue in the 
interracial marriage debate because of the socio-racial divide between the North and 
South. Northern states often allowed interracial marriages to be performed, or at least 
recognized interracial marriages if they had been performed legally in another state. In 
the South, however, these marriages were banned and went unrecognized. For Black-
White couples, obtaining a valid marriage license was an issue, but the granting of 
recognition to their union was a separate and very important issue that confused and 
complicated the lives of numerous interracial couples. By crossing a state line, a couple 
could go from being married to being un-wed and in violation of the law. This could also 
affect the benefits coupes received; if they went from a state that recognized 
intermarriage to one that did not, they often lost all of the legal benefits that accompany a 
formal marriage. Eventually, this confusion, and to some extent resentment generated due 
to this confusion, built up and resulted in a social call for a singular, unified, recognized, 
federal ruling on the legality of interracial marriage, hence Loving v. Virginia. 
 The final detail that must be understood in order to recognize why interracial 
marriage was ultimately legalized is the role of legal precedent. Precedent can have a 
powerful impact on the outcome of a court case. It reestablishes a legal reason for a 
particular decision, and lends validity to that decision. For example, from 1883 until 
1948, Pace v. Alabama was used as the legal precedent to uphold bans on intermarriage. 
! ""!
However, after the 1948, Perez v. Sharp became the precedent, upholding an idea of a 
constitutional right to marriage guaranteed to all citizens. This precedent was referenced 
in McLaughlin v. Florida in 1964, leading to a decision in favor of the plaintiffs that the 
law against interracial cohabitation was unconstitutional. After 1964, this duo precedent 
of Perez and McLaughlin was used, in combination with the literal interpretation of the 
Constitution, to support the Loving v. Virginia decision, which legalized interracial 
marriage nationally. 
 Socially, the most important factor in the legalization process for interracial 
marriage - besides understanding the influence of White privilege and patriarchy on the 
American social structure – is historical timeframe. Each case must be viewed 
individually as a product of the time in which it was tried, and also cumulatively as the 
slow progression of law and society towards the acceptance of interracial marriage. Each 
of the three interracial marriage cases discussed in detail, Pace v. Alabama, Perez v. 
Sharp, and Loving v. Virginia, were representative of the American social attitude 
towards intermarriage at a particular moment, and under very specific circumstances. 
However, each case also built off of the previous case and indicated the growing 
acceptance of Black-White marriage by American society. 
 Pace v. Alabama, decided in 1883, was a product of the Reconstruction era. In the 
post-Civil War South, there was a deep-rooted unease for the new freedom of African 
Americans, and a strong aversion to the interaction of the races in any form, let alone 
through a sexual relationship or state-sanctioned union.
8
 This social stigma and the 
persistence of racist ideology towards African Americans, despite the 14
th
 Amendment 
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granting equal citizenship to Blacks, explains why the court found in favor of the state, 
upholding Alabama’s miscegenation law. Although the constitutionality of the ban was 
questionable, the social climate of the late 19
th
 century was not conducive to a redefining 
of the institution of marriage. In this way, Pace reflected social attitudes through law, and 
interpreted the law to maintain the social norms of that particular time. 
 In 1948, when Perez v. Sharp was decided, the United States was embarking on a 
tumultuous social transformation. World War II had resulted in a profound reassessment 
of American race-relations. The Holocaust had demonstrated the horrendous and 
immense power of active social stigma against a group based on predetermined 
characteristics, which effectively shocked America out of much of the racist haze that had 
encompassed society before the war.
9
 Similarly, WWII had necessitated the participation 
of African American soldiers in combat, which produced two important changes. The 
first change came from abroad; Black soldiers were able to more freely interact with 
European White women, fostering ideas of the social acceptance of interracial 
relationships.
10
 Secondly, the risk of life and the trauma of combat was the same for all 
soldiers, regardless of race, which increased demands for social equality on the home 
front. African American soldiers felt that if they risked their lives, alongside their White 
counterparts, for their country that nonetheless suppressed their rights and treated them as 
second-class citizens, they were entitled to the same rights and to be treated with the 
same respect as White Americans.
11
 The repercussions of WWII lead to the liberalization 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 203. 
10
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 197-199. 
11
 Pascoe, What Comes Naturally, 199-201; Cott, Public Vows, 180. 
! "#!
of American society, which progressed into the rise of the Civil Rights Movement in the 
1950s and the ensuing call for racial equality. 
 Finally, Loving v. Virginia was presented to the court in the midst of the Civil 
Rights Movement and at the height of 20
th
 century American social liberalism. The Civil 
Rights Movement called for racial equality by law and in social practice; spurred forward 
by the progressively liberal ideology pervading America in the 1960s, the movement 
resulted in the federal desegregation of schools in 1954, Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
federal outlawing of bans on interracial marriage in 1967.
12
 If it had not been for the 
precedent set by such cases as Perez v. Sharp and McLaughlin v. Florida, and the specific 
social climate of the Civil Rights era, the United States Supreme Court may have ruled 
against the Lovings, rather than in their favor, and interracial marriage may never have 
been legalized. The decision in this case was the culmination of all previous 
miscegenation cases, built-up frustration surrounding intermarriage bans, and the perfect 
storm of social forces resulting from the post-World War II socio-political inclination 
towards peace, progress, and equality. Society had been progressively changing, and the 
law had finally caught up to the new liberal current, in regard to American race relations, 
with the Supreme Court decision in Loving v. Virginia. 
 Besides explaining why miscegenation laws were created and maintained, and in 
addition to discussing what I consider to be the three most important court cases in the 
legalization of interracial marriage, this thesis also aimed to discuss the evolutionary 
nature of marriage. Historically, marriage unions have, over time, became increasingly 
subjected to social control and, eventually, required formal state-sanction. This control 
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tended to dictate that the man and woman to be married were of suitable compatibility: 
socioeconomically equivalent, comparable education, and from similar familial 
backgrounds, including being of the same race. Over time, marriage has been redefined 
numerous times, allowing for more socioeconomic diversity within couples and more 
independence from familial and social sanction in selection of a marriage partner.
13
 From 
a private decision to a socially controlled custom; from a bond formed on promises 
between two people to a state-regulated institution; from forever to the legalization and 
rapid increase in divorce; and from similar backgrounds to marrying whomever one 
loves; marriage is not, nor has it ever been, a singular entity. 
The intense opposition to interracial marriage primarily stemmed from White 
supremacy and the patriarchy of society. White men believed themselves above all 
others; they were legally, fiscally, and often physically in charge of White and Black 
women, and Black men. Put simply, White men were at the top of the American social 
hierarchy by a wide margin, and intended to remain unencumbered by the demands of 
women or Blacks for equal social and legal rights. This determination to maintain social 
superiority resulted in one social custom remaining in place and legally enforced: the ban 
on Black-White marriage. When reduced to the basics, White men feared that, if 
intermarriage were legalized, they would: lose their unfettered sexual access to Black 
women, encounter competition for the sexual attention of White women, and experience 
a reduced social standing of the White race due to racial amalgamation. They also greatly 
feared that they would become the social equivalent, or even subordinate, of Black men. 
However, by the 1960s, social action such as the Civil Rights Movement indicated a 
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! "#!
general change in social perceptions, and helped to bring about the legalization of 
interracial marriage, but only in combination with strong legal precedent, a restructuring 
of the definition of marriage, and a socio-legal build-up through each successive case 
about interracial marriage. The legalization of intermarriage was a substantial redefining 
of marriage as an American institution; it symbolized the newfound social and legal 
equality of Blacks to Whites, something that had been denied and opposed for centuries. 
By now, four points should be clear. First, marriage is an ever-evolving 
institution. Secondly, that the legalization of interracial marriage was brought about by 
the progressive liberalization of social attitudes towards race. Thirdly, that this social 
liberalization was expressed through each successive court decision made in regard to 
interracial marriage, and that intermarriage would never have been legalized if not for the 
precedent set by, and a specific interpretation of, the law. A final point worth noting is 
that interracial marriage was banned primarily to maintain the social prestige and power 
of White men over African Americans, both men and women, and White women. 
Regardless of the attempts of the U.S. legal system to create a uniform definition, 
marriage is a transformative institution subject to change according to the social climate. 
Miscegenation laws were a combination of the social factors of race, gender, and 
sexuality, taken together and then subjected to the socio-legal sanctions of a particular 
historical period. It was the combination of these three factors into the sexualization of 
race, the enforcement of White male superiority in society, and the idea of racial purity to 
maintain the existing social hierarchy that, I argue, both created the need for and 
maintained the use of miscegenation laws throughout the United States from the 18
th
 
century until 1967. Each of the three cases I presented in this thesis mark discrete points 
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of change in the socio-political climate regarding marriage. In these moments, law and 
society interacted to question the legal standing of interracial marriage, and the result of 
each case indicated a significant change in the perception and definition of the institution 
of marriage. The specific legal precedents established throughout the interracial marriage 
debate and the precise social timing of Loving v. Virginia enabled the legalization of 
interracial marriage, marking a momentous transformation to the traditional conception 
of this institution as well as indicating a significant social liberalization in regard to 
American race relations. 
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“It [the right to marry] is a right that, though unstated in the federal Constitution, 
emanates from the penumbra of several guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”1 
 
“Therefore, the precise question is whether we will extend the present boundaries 
of the fundamental right of marriage to include same-sex couples, or, put another way, 
whether we will hold that same-sex couples possess a fundamental right to marry. In 
effect, as the applicant couples frankly admit, we are being asked to recognize a new 
fundamental right…”2 
 
EPILOGUE 
THE LOVE THAT BINDS US: 
OVERCOMING THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DIVIDE BY EXAMINING THE 
PAST 
Although legally separate from the issue of interracial marriage, the social debate 
over the legalization of same-sex marriage closely mirrors that of the debate over 
interracial marriage more than half of a century ago.3 In both cases, the opposition was 
rooted in religion, conservative social values, and issues of child welfare. Yet, in both 
cases, the supporting contingent referenced the rights of individuals, the unalterable 
circumstances of these couples, the freedom of choice in marriage, and equality for all 
citizens. Claims such as the one I am suggesting, that there are overwhelming similarities 
between interracial and same-sex marriage in regard to the legal and social issues at 
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1 “Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44(1993),” University of Massachusetts. Accessed 29 
January 2013. people.umass.edu/leg450/Cases%20and%20statutes/Baehr.pdf; hereafter referred 
to as “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. See Appendix A. 
2 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
3 In a very similar circumstance, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Lawrence v. Texas (2003), a 
homosexual couple was reported to authorities and arrested for violating a Texas anti-sodomy 
law. In order to make the arrest, the police entered the house without making themselves known 
to the couple, much like the Caroline County sheriff who arrested the Lovings. Information from: 
“Lawrence v. Texas (02-102) 539 U.S. 558 (2003),” Cornell University Law School, accessed 20 
February 2013, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html. See Appendix C. 
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stake, have already been applied to the same-sex marriage debate by those in favor of 
legalization, and are used as precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage.4 
One of the primary reasons marriage is still a significant social and legal 
classification is because marriage provides certain legal benefits that are only granted to 
spouses. Joint tax filing, tax benefits, health care rights and the power to make health-
related decisions, access to and rights over children, citizenship rights (in some cases), 
and many other valuable – socially and monetarily – rights. These benefits are exclusive 
to marriage, and sought after by many couples that are committed to each other and a 
shared life.5 These rights are only extended to same-sex couples in certain states, and are 
still limited in their actual usefulness since some states refuse to recognize these rights for 
same-sex couples entirely. 
There are three main arguments used to maintain bans on same-sex marriage. In 
no particular order, the first is the argument based on religion and the Will of God; 
secondly, the argument of the socio-legal definition of marriage; and finally the debate 
over the welfare of children involved in these unions. Many people, especially those 
affiliated with a conservative political or religious organization, maintain that 
homosexuality is against the will of God and unnatural. In this ideology, people contend 
that “If God had intended for same-sex couples to marry, he would have made Adam and 
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4 Coontz, Marriage, A History, 256; Abbott, A History of Marriage, 279; Pascoe, What Comes 
Naturally, 288, 298-300. 
5 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993; “Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, 199 Haw. Lexis 391 (Haw. Dec. 9, 
1999),” Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, accessed 29 January 2013, 
www.wcl.american.edu/journal/genderlaw/08/baehr.pdfjavascript:void(0), hereafter referred to 
as “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
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Steve, not Adam and Eve.”6 Arguments such as this are also applied to the socio-legal 
definition of marriage. Those against same-sex marriage propose that allowing such 
marriages would erode the value of traditional, heterosexual marriage, and that the term 
“marriage” itself only implies a union between one man and one woman. Finally, one of 
the strongest arguments against permitting same-sex marriage is the welfare of children 
raised in these households. Many same-sex marriage opponents suggest that children 
raised in a homosexual household are stigmatized, social disadvantaged, or, more 
radically, that they are predisposed to homosexual tendencies through exposure to such 
couples.7 As this thesis has demonstrated, all three of these arguments were also used to 
create and maintain legal bans on intermarriage from the 18th century until the Loving v. 
Virginia decision in 1967 erased these legal barriers. 
Similarly, the patriarchal and heteronormative social structure of the United States 
preserves prohibitions on same-sex marriage, much as these same social aspects were 
used to continue the dominance of White men over Black men and women in the case of 
intermarriage. Although both some men and women oppose same-sex marriage, it is the 
inherent heteronormativity of American society that forms the basis for this 
stigmatization of homosexuals.8 The traditional social construct of family and the 
difference emphasized in American culture between masculine and feminine create a 
social atmosphere that has, in the past, been less conducive to the granting of equal rights 
and recognition to same-sex couples. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 “From Legal Rights to Equal Rights, Arguments for the Preservation of ‘Traditional’ Marriage: 
Then and Now,” Vermont Freedom to Marry, 4 February 2013, accessed 20 October, 2012, 
http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/; hereafter referred to as “From Legal Rights to Equal Rights,” 
2013. 
7 “From Legal to Equal Rights,” 2013. 
8 Abbott, A History of Marriage, 279. 
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More recently, bans on same-sex marriage are encountering legal and social 
resistance, mainly from an increasingly vocal LGBTQ community and allies, indicating 
that society is coming to recognize the fundamental right to marry extends to all citizens, 
regardless of sexual orientation. Similarly, the law is coming to recognize the same right. 
In Baehr v. Miike, the Hawaii Supreme Court Justice Goldberg stated that, “judges 
‘determining which rights are fundamental’ must look not to ‘personal and private 
notions,’ but to the ‘traditions and (collective) conscience of our people’ to determine 
whether a principle is ‘so rooted (there) … as to be ranked as fundamental.’”9 This quote 
suggests that the law must look beyond personal views about sexuality in order to 
acknowledge the rights guaranteed to Americans and ensure that these rights are applied 
as necessitated by law.  
To counter the “traditional” marriage standpoint, there are three main arguments 
in favor of same-sex marriage that have developed recently and gained power among 
supporters of same-sex marriage. First are the unalterable circumstances of individuals in 
these relationships, second is the guaranteed freedom of choice in marriage granted to all 
citizens, and finally the equality under and equal application of the law for all citizens. 
The second and third reasons are, in fact, largely based the precedent set by the 
legalization of interracial marriage. Recently, it is becoming accepted to state that sexual 
orientation is an unalterable circumstance; that it is not a choice to be gay or straight, but, 
rather, it is a biological predisposition, much like skin color. If one cannot control their 
sexual orientation, then it is not just to restrict their definition of love through 
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heteronormative constructs and to take from them the ability to formally recognize this 
bond. 
The reasoning of unalterable circumstances thus relates to back to the second 
argument that every citizen is guaranteed the right to marry whomever they chose. This 
“right,” as it is now recognized to be, stems from the Loving v. Virginia case, which 
established the ability to marry as an inherent right of American citizens, guaranteed 
through the Constitution. And, the second argument is intrinsically linked with the third: 
that all laws must be equally applied to citizens and that all citizens are viewed as equal 
under the law. This argument was used in every case of interracial marriage examined in 
this thesis, and it is similarly used to advance the right to marry for same-sex couples 
today. The precedent established by the legalization of interracial marriage and the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions made in those cases created a persuasive argument in favor of 
the legalization of same-sex marriage, one that cannot simply be ignored because the 
thought of homosexual marriage is unappealing to some social, political, religious, or 
otherwise structured viewpoints; 46 years ago, it was interracial marriage that was 
considered to be unappealing. 
Finally, the social movement for equality and human rights taking place today is 
reminiscent of the Civil Rights era social climate, creating a setting that is probably, once 
again, conducive to socio-legal change. Much like the movements for racial equality, 
there are organizations giving voice to the Queer community today and calling for social 
and legal change. Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), the International 
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) – which has worked closely 
with the United Nations – and the ACLU are all organizations that promote humanitarian 
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rights for everyone, despite gender identification or sexual orientation. Similarly, the 
Queer community is becoming more active, with national movements such as the Day of 
Silence and Pride Parades, which increase awareness and promote equal rights for the 
Queer identifies community. National movements and social currents such as this are 
reminiscent of the national movements that took place to reform race relations in 
America, and suggest that there is a similar reform of sex and gender relations taking 
place in the United States today. However, much like the slow progression towards 
legalizing intermarriage, the changes taking place today in regard to same-sex marriage 
are the result of a long socio-legal process, one that began to really take hold in the 
second half of the 20th century.  
As was recognized in Loving v. Virginia, individuals have a right to marry, even if 
that right is not explicitly stated in the Constitution. Three years after the Loving decision, 
one of the first nationally recognized attempts to have this right recognized in the case of 
same-sex marriage occurred. In 1970, Jack Baker (born Richard John Baker, 1942) and 
Michael McConnell (born James Michael McConnell, 1942) applied for a marriage 
license in Hennepin County, Minnesota. At the time, Minnesota law did not ban two men 
from receiving a license that would recognize their marriage, and the law as written 
implied that recognition be granted to any legal matter brought before the court that was 
not formally denied. Thus, the court could not formally deny the marriage license to the 
couple since there was no legal reason to do so, but ignored the law as written and still 
refused to issue it. By 1971, Baker and McConnell re-filed in Blue Earth County, and, 
this time, the waiting period expired before the couple was formally denied; this led to a 
de facto granting of their marriage license. On September 3, 1971, Reverend Roger Lynn 
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solemnized their marriage. Technically, this made Baker and McConnell one of the 
earliest married same-sex couples in the United States. 
However, this marriage was not legally recognized since McConnell and Baker 
had found a loophole that allowed them to circumvent the intentions of the law. 
Therefore, in August of 1971, McConnell formally adopted Baker, who legally changed 
his name to Pat Lynn McConnell. Adoption allowed the couple to file joint taxes, share a 
last name, and defend their legal bond as a couple. Since the adoption was a recognized, 
legal contract binding them together, Baker’s adoption served to earn the couples many 
of the same rights a legally recognized marriage would have. From 1973 until 2004, 
Baker and McConnell continuously filed joint taxes, only ceasing when federal laws were 
amended in 2005 to limit adoption ages to children until 19 years of age.10 Despite the 
legal change, Baker and McConnell continued to live as if they were married. 
Two decades after the marriage (legally recognized of not) of Baker and 
McConnell, the question of same-sex marriage yet again made national news. In Hawaii 
in 1990, three separate couples filed for marriage licenses, and all three were denied on 
the grounds that same-sex couples could not be issued marriage licenses in Hawaii. Two 
of the couples were comprised of two women, and one couple was two men; these three 
couples jointly sued the state of Hawaii and the Hawaii Department of Health 
(represented by the state health director, John C. Lewin) in a case that became known as 
Baehr v. Miike.11 In the case, Lewin, the director of the DOH of Hawaii and defendant-
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10 “Jack Baker (activist),” Wikipedia, 19 February 2013, accessed 20 February 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_Baker_%28activist%29. 
11 Baehr v. Miike (1999) is also known as Baehr v. Lewin (1993); I will be referring to this case as 
Baehr v. Miike for consistency, to avoid confusion, and because that was the name used for the 
final U.S. Supreme Court decision on the case in 1999. 
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appellee, argued that these couples did not have the right to marry because they could not 
satisfy the requirements of marriage: namely that they were not one man and one woman, 
and that they could not produce children, in the traditional sense, through their union.12 
The law stipulated that, in order to win their case, the plaintiffs had to prove “a narrowly-
drawn compelling state interest to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional 
rights.”13  In 1991, the case was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to state 
a claim against the defendant for which relief can be granted. However, the court 
recognized that, “the applicant couples are free to press their equal protection claim. If 
they are successful, the State of Hawaii will no longer be permitted to refuse marriage 
licenses to couples merely on the basis that they are of the same sex.”14 Thus, the couples 
amended their claim and re-filed their case. 
In 1993, the Circuit Court of Hawaii reconsidered the case and found in favor of 
the plaintiffs: the original ruling against them had been unconstitutional.15 The Circuit 
Court found that the denial of these marriage licenses had been “unconstitutional insofar 
as it is construed and applied by the DOH [Hawaii Department of Health] to justify 
refusing to issue a marriage license on the sole basis that the applicant couple is of the 
same sex.”16 Although the Circuit Court found that the couples had been “denied the 
licenses solely on the grounds that the three couples were of the same sex,” which was 
unconstitutional, the Hawaii legislature quickly passed an amendment to the Hawaii 
Constitution, which reserved the right of the state to deny marriage to same-sex couples, 
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12 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
13 “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
14 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
15 “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
16 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
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thereby circumventing the decision of the Court. 17 Upon amending the constitution, the 
Hawaii Supreme Court stated, 
we [Supreme Court of Hawaii] do not believe that a right to same-sex 
marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our 
people that failure to recognize is would violate the fundamental principles 
of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.18 
Against this new amendment, the plaintiffs’ arguments became moot, and the right to 
marry was restricted to “be between two people of the opposite sex.”19 Largely in 
response to cases such as Baehr where same-sex couples pursued the right to marry, 
Congress passes an act similar to that of Hawaii’s new amendment, the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA, 1996), which federally defined marriage as a union of one man 
and one woman.20 By defining marriage, the federal government created a legal reason to 
ban same-sex marriage, and the means to enforce such a prohibition. 
However, by the time Baehr v. Miike reached the Hawaii Supreme Court, there 
had been numerous legal precedents established, largely through the legalization process 
of interracial marriage, regarding the right to marry. For example, by the 1990s it was 
recognized, even in Hawaii, that: 
a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” […] “(n)o person shall … be denied the equal 
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, 
religion, sex, or ancestry. […] The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free [people].” So ‘fundamental’ does the United !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
18 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
19 “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
20 Defense of Marriage Act, “Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One-Hundred and Fourth Congress, 
Second Session, on H.R. 3396: Defense of Marriage Act,” (15 May 1996): 1-247; hereafter 
referred to as DOMA, 1996. See Appendix A. 
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States Supreme Court consider the institution of marriage that it has 
deemed marriage to be “one of the ‘basic civil rights of (men and 
women).’”21 
Despite this recognition, these couples were not extended the fundamental right to marry. 
Regardless of the outcome, Baehr v. Miike had a similar impact on the national view 
towards same-sex marriage as Perez v. Sharp had for interracial marriage. Even though 
the court had found in favor of the plaintiffs, the national standard of heterosexual 
marriage had ultimately been upheld. Yet, the case marked a momentous political and 
social shift towards the consideration of same-sex marriage as legally valid and towards 
marriage as an inherent right of all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation.22 
It is hard to distinguish whether Baehr v. Miike set a precedent for same-sex 
marriage, or if it helped to solidify the federal definition of ‘marriage’ as a union between 
one man and one woman. Nevertheless, Baehr brought the issue of equality for 
homosexuals to the forefront of 21st century American politics. Until 1996, there was no 
officially recognized federal definition of marriage, but under DOMA, marriage became 
defined as, and therefore restricted to, a heterosexual union.23 Had Baehr v. Miike not 
catapulted legal challenges to same-sex marriage bans into the socio-political 
consciousness of the nation, perhaps DOMA would not have, necessarily, restricted 
marriage in the same way. However, this is yet another reason to link Baehr v. Miike to 
the interracial marriage court cases of the past; had Pace v. Alabama not pushed 
interracial marriage law into the social agenda and had Perez v. Sharp not established 
legal precedent for overturning intermarriage bans, perhaps interracial marriage would 
still be illegal today. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 “Baehr v. Lewin,” 1993. 
22 “Baehr v. Miike,” 1999. 
23 DOMA, 1996. 
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At one time, there were 40 states that banned interracial marriage.24 Today, that 
seems shocking and inherently racist. As of January 2013, there are only 9 states that 
allow same-sex marriages, meaning there are 41 states which deny the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.25 Many of the same arguments made against interracial marriage from 
the 18th to mid-20th centuries are the same as those used to discriminate against same-sex 
couples by denying them the right to marry today. In both cases, people who argued 
against these marriages stated that these marriages were against God’s will, were 
immoral and unnatural, the children would be physically or mentally disabled and at a 
social disadvantage, and the traditional values of marriage would be violated. However, 
these arguments were overcome in regard to interracial marriage, establishing a strong 
legal precedent for legalizing same-sex marriage. When examined concurrently, the 
reasoning behind bans on same-sex marriage can clearly be seen to be based on the same 
reasoning that was used to maintain miscegenation laws; this same reasoning was 
ultimately proven faulty in the Loving v. Virginia trial. Hence, the reasoning behind 
same-sex marriage bans cannot, based on socio-legal historical precedent, 
constitutionally be maintained, leading to the conclusion that same-sex marriage will 
eventually be legalized, much like interracial marriage was 46 years ago. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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25 “Same-sex Marriage in the United States,” Wikipedia, 19 February 2013, accessed 20 February 
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APPENDIX A 
LEGISLATIVE APPENDIX 
United States Constitutional Law 
 1. 5
th
 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
  The 5
th
 Amendment, in regard to this thesis, is most significant in its 
guarantee of life, liberty, and property, as well as the guarantee of due process of the law. 
Due process has been interpreted to mean that each citizen is guaranteed to a recognition 
and protection of individual rights, and that citizens are guaranteed a fundamentally fair 
application of the law. 
“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, […] nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”
12
 
 
2. 14
th
 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
 The 14
th
 Amendment granted citizenship to African Americans, and also 
guarantees equal protection of the law under the Equal Protection Clause within the 
Amendment. 
A. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
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1
 “U.S. Constitution 5
th
 and 14
th
 Amendments.” findUSlaw. 2012, accessed 16 March 2012. 
http://finduslaw.com/us-constitution-5th-14th-amendments#1. 
2
 In reference to this paper, the 5
th
 Amendment is most applicable due to the Due Process clause 
contained within it, which is guaranteed to all U.S. citizens and has been referenced in numerous 
U.S. Supreme Court cases as justification for extending rights to citizens who were formally 
denied such rights (i.e. Loving v. Virginia). 
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shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.
3
 
B. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article”
4
 
C. The 14
th
 Amendment was “ratified on July 9, 1868, and granted 
citizenship to ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States,’ which 
included former slaves recently freed. In addition, it forbids states from 
denying any person ‘life, liberty or property, without due process of law’ 
or to ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.’ By directly mentioning the role of the states, the 14th Amendment 
greatly expanded the protection of civil rights to all Americans and is cited 
in more litigation than any other amendment.”
5
 
 
3. Equal Protection Clause 
 The Equal Protection Clause guarantees all citizens equal protection of the 
law. This is more aptly referred to as the equal application clause, since it is more a 
guarantee that the law must be equally applied to all citizens, regardless of race, sex, etc. 
“The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution prohibits states from denying any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. In other words, the laws of a 
state must treat an individual in the same manner as others in similar 
conditions and circumstances. The equal protection clause is not intended 
to provide ‘equality’ among individuals or classes but only ‘equal 
application’ of the laws. The result, therefore, of a law is not relevant so 
long as there is no discrimination in its application. By denying states the 
ability to discriminate, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is 
crucial to the protection of civil rights.”
6
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 Section 1 of the 14
th
 Amendment thereby granted citizenship to former slaves and guaranteed 
equal protection of the law to all citizens of the United States, former slaves included, regardless 
of their race. 
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 “Constitution of the United States, Amendments 11-27.” National Archives. Accessed 16 March 
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The distinction made here between equality and equal application is crucial to this paper. 
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees equal application of the law, which is not the 
same as guaranteeing equality to all. This distinction is used both to support and to refute 
interracial and same-sex marriage bans. For instance, courts have argued that Equal 
Protection has not been violated because (a) marriage was denied to people of both races 
in an interracial marriage situation, and (b) marriage was denied to people of both 
genders in the case of same-sex marriages (meaning denied to both lesbian and gay male 
couples). However, the broader interpretation of Equal Protection has led to the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling that the 14
th
 Amendment was indeed violated by such policies (i.e. 
Loving v. Virginia). 
4. Full Faith and Credit Clause 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause implies the supra-state recognition of contracts 
legally made in any of the U.S. states. 
“Under the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause (Article IV, 
Section 1), states are expected to recognize the public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of every other state.”
7
 
This implies that states must recognize (though not necessarily be required to 
grant) all marriages legally performed in any of the other states or U.S. territories 
or possessions. 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Rulings (in chronological order) 
1. Pace v. Alabama (1883) 
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 Pace v. Alabama was the first case that established precedent on how to proceed 
in miscegenation cases. Upheld the state of Alabama’s right to ban interracial marriages 
on the precedent that both the White and Black individuals were being treated equally 
(both were banned from marrying one another). 
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two 
sections is directed against the offense designated and not against the 
person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending 
person, whether White or Black, is the same.
8
 
 
2. Perez v. Sharp (1948) 
1948 ruling by the Supreme Court of California that found the bans against 
interracial marriage were unconstitutional, and therefore could not be upheld. This 
became one of the cases to establish precedent for the eventual decision in Loving v. 
Virginia, which federally overturned intermarriage bans. Although this case only 
overturned the bans in California, as opposed to overturning miscegenation laws 
nationwide, it was still a significant socio-legal indicator of the progressive acceptance of 
intermarriage by America.
9
 
3. Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
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8
 “U.S. Supreme Court Pace v. State of Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (29 January 1883). Accessed from 
http://www.lovingday.org/pace-v-alabama. 
9
 “U.S. Supreme Court PACE v. STATE, 106 U.S. 583 (1883),” FindLaw, accessed 10 
September 2012, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-
bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=106&invol=583; “Pace v. Alabama,” The Loving Day, accessed 10 
September 2012, http://www.lovingday.org/pace-v-alabama 
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Used the 14
th
 Amendment and Equal Opportunity to justify the desegregation of 
public schools. Claimed that segregation on basis of race alone was not justified under 
the constitution
10
 
In Brown v. Board it was decided that, 
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State 
solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring 
such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even though the physical 
facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be 
equal.
11
 
 
4. Civil Rights Act (1964) 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was meant to guarantee equal protection for African 
Americans in regard to career and employment selection processes. It also aimed to erase 
some of the social and socio-legal barriers in place that discriminated against minorities, 
and gave Whites preferential treatment or selection. 
In 1964 Congress passed Public Law 82-352 (78 Stat. 241). The 
provisions of this civil rights act forbade discrimination on the basis of sex 
as well as race in hiring, promoting, and firing.[…] In the final legislation, 
Section 703 (a) made it unlawful for an employer to ‘fail or refuse to hire 
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges or employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.’ The final bill also allowed sex to be a 
consideration when sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for the 
job. Title VII of the act created the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to implement the law.”
12
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 “Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (USSC+).” The National Center for Public 
Policy Research, The Supreme Court of the United States. 17 May 1954, accessed 16 March 
2012. http://www.nationalcenter.org/brown.html. 
11
 “Brown v. Board of Education on Topeka (No. 1),” Cornell University Law School, accessed 
17 February 2013, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0347_0483_ZS.html 
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 “Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission.” The National Archives. Accessed 21 March 2012. 
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“The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  Passage of the Act ended the 
application of "Jim Crow" laws, which had been upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Court held that 
racial segregation purported to be "separate but equal" was constitutional.  
The Civil Rights Act was eventually expanded by Congress to strengthen 
enforcement of these fundamental civil rights.
13
 
 
5. McLaughlin v. Florida (1964) 
McLaughlin v. Florida established precedent for the ruling in Loving v. Virginia 
three years later. Like the Lovings’ case, this case involved police entering the home of 
an interracial couple and placing them under arrest for violating a Florida ban on 
cohabitation. However, this case did not discuss interracial marriage. Since the couple 
was not married, and because the U.S. Supreme Court wanted to avoid dealing with a 
federal ruling on interracial marriage, given that the Civil Rights Act was also in the 
legislative process at this time and was viewed as a more important ruling than the 
McLaughlin decision, the Supreme Court ruled solely on the principle of interracial 
cohabitation. The court, however, did find in favor of the plaintiffs and declared the 
Florida law unconstitutional. 
The appellants, a Negro man and a white woman, were convicted of violating a 
Florida statute which proscribed cohabitation between Negro and white persons 
who are not married to each other. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the appellants 
claimed: (1) The statute was invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws 
since it applied only to members of certain races, and (2) they were denied due 
process and equal protection of the laws because a Florida law prohibiting 
interracial marriage prevented them from establishing the defense of common law 
marriage. The appellants thus hoped to reach the issue of whether the state's 
prohibition of interracial marriage contravened the fourteenth amendment. The 
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Supreme Court, basing its decision on the single issue of equal protection 
(appellants' first claim), set aside the conviction and invalidated the cohabitation 
statute. Finding this claim to be dispositive of the case, the Court refrained from 
expressing any view as to the constitutionality of the law prohibiting interracial 
marriages.
14
 
 
6. Loving v. Virginia (1967) 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this 
Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to 
prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial 
classifications violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons which seem to us to reflect the 
central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these 
statutes cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. 
[…]There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent 
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The 
fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white 
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their 
own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy. We 
have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict 
the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that 
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications 
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
15
  
[…]Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental 
to our very existence and survival.
16
 To deny this fundamental freedom on 
so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these 
statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the 
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted 
by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to 
marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual 
and cannot be infringed by the State. 
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 Lee M. Miller, “Constitutionality Of Miscegenation Statutes - McLaughlin v. Florida, 25 Md. 
L. Rev. 41 (1965)”, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Maryland Law 
Review, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol25/iss1/5. 
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 The primary reasoning behind the decision of the court in Loving v. Virginia was violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause, and to some extent the Due Process Clause, of the 14
th
 Amendment. 
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 This statement provides legal precedent for the federal legalization of same-sex marriage (as 
argued by same-sex marriage proponents). 
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These convictions must be reversed. 
It is so ordered.
17
 
7. Baehr v. Lewin (1993) 
 See Baehr v. Miike (1999). 
8. The Defense of Marriage Act (D.O.M.A.) (1996) 
The Defense of Marriage Act (Sept. 21, 1996) is a federal law that 
denies federal recognition of same-sex marriages and authorizes states to 
refuse to recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states. 
[…]The text of DOMA is very brief and contains only two 
provisions. The first provision states that no state, territory, or Indian tribe 
shall be required to legally recognize a ‘relationship between persons of 
the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of another state, 
territory, or Indian tribe.’ This language tells these jurisdictions that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause has no application to same sex marriages. 
The second provision directs the federal government to follow a 
definition of the word marriage that means ‘only a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife.’ Likewise, the word spouse 
is defined as a ‘person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.’ 
These definitions are meant to preclude a same-sex couple that has been 
married in a state from being eligible for federal benefits such as married 
Income Tax status and Social Security survivor benefits. In effect, DOMA 
bars federal recognition of same-sex marriages through the use of these 
definitions.
18
 
 
9. Baehr v. Miike (1999) (Also known as Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) 
 This case was brought to the Hawaii Supreme Court after three couples jointly 
sued the Hawaii Department of Health after being refused marriage licenses on the 
grounds that each of the three couples were same-sex couples. The court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to deny these citizens the right to marry based on sex alone. However, 
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 “The Loving Decision (12 June 1967).” Association of Multi-Ethnic Americans. 2006, accessed 
16 March 2012. http://www.ameasite.org/loving.asp. 
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 “Defense of Marriage of 1996.” The Free Dictionary by Farlex. 2012, accessed 16 March 
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the Hawaii legislature quickly passed an amendment to the Hawaii Constitution that 
outlawed same-sex marriage, effectively circumventing the decision of the court. The 
couples re-filed and in 1999 it was decided that the state had the right to limit or prohibit 
marriage as long as the constitutional rights of citizens were not violated, and that no 
violation had taken place in this instance. 
a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” […] “(n)o person shall … be denied the equal 
protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil 
rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, 
religion, sex, or ancestry. […] The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free [people].” So ‘fundamental’ does the United 
States Supreme Court consider the institution of marriage that it has 
deemed marriage to be “one of the ‘basic civil rights of (men and 
women).’”
19
 
 
10. Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, declared 
unconstitutional a Texas law that prohibited sexual acts between same sex 
couples. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that the 
right to privacy protects a right for adults to engage in private, consensual 
homosexual activity. […The court’s prior ruling was found to be] 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because it prohibits sexual 
acts between same sex couples that are allowed between opposite sex 
couples. […] ‘When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal 
bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.’ [Justice 
Kennedy]
20
 
 
11. Respect for Marriage Act (introduced to the 111
th
 Congress, 2009; introduced to 
the 112
th
 Congress, 2011; passage pending) 
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This act would repeal the Defense of Marriage Act (1996) and would require 
states to grant recognition to any marriage legally performed in a U.S. possession, 
territory, or state, or performed outside of the U.S. if it could have been legally performed 
in the U.S. under federal law. However, this act does not require states to grant same-sex 
marriage, and does not suggest federally legalizing same-sex marriage either. 
To repeal the Defense of Marriage Act and ensure respect for State 
regulation of marriage. […]For the purposes of any Federal law in which 
marital status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married if that 
individual's marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered 
into […].
21
 
 
(a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital status is a factor, 
an individual shall be considered married if that individual's marriage is 
valid in the State where the marriage was entered into or, in the case of a 
marriage entered into outside any State, if the marriage is valid in the 
place where entered into and the marriage could have been entered into in 
a State. 
(b) In this section, the term 'State' means a State, the District of Columbia, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other territory or possession of 
the United States.
22
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1. Heteronormative –  
• “denoting or relating to a world view that promotes heterosexuality as the 
normal or preferred sexual orientation”
23
 
• “Heteronormativity is the cultural bias in favor of opposite-sex 
relationships of a sexual nature, and against same-sex relationships of a 
sexual nature. Because the former are viewed as normal and the latter are 
not, lesbian and gay relationships are subject to a heteronormative bias.”
24
 
2. Interracial – 
• For the purposes of this thesis, the term “interracial” refers to a dyadic, 
sexual or romantic relationship between two individuals, one of which is 
Caucasian American and the other African American. 
3. Marriage –  
• “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife”
25
 (as defined by the federal government of 
the United States in the Defense of Marriage Act, 1996) 
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4. Miscegenation –  
• “a mixture of races; especially : marriage, cohabitation, or sexual 
intercourse between a white person and a member of another race”
26
!
• “Cohabitation, sexual relations, marriage, or interbreeding involving 
persons of different races, especially in historical contexts as a 
transgression of the law.”
27
 
5. Same-Sex – 
• In the context of this thesis, the term “same-sex” refers to two individuals 
who are of the same biological sex, regardless of their gender or sexuality 
identification (two biological males or two biological females). 
• The term will most often be used in reference to a same-sex dyadic, sexual 
or romantic relationship between two individuals, usually in reference to 
formal marriage and civil unions. 
Spouse –  
• “the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife”
28
 (as defined by the federal government of the United 
States in the Defense of Marriage Act, 1996) 
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APPENDIX C 
INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN THE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF RACE 
This appendix provides brief summaries of articles and government documents 
which lend support to the statements made in this thesis that the United States exhibited a 
liberal socio-legal shift in regard to interracial marriage and race, which resulted in a 
greater acceptance of interracial relationships and mixed-race individuals. There are 
seven references included. 
 
1. Garcia, Matt. “Social Movements, the Rise of Colorblind Conservatism and What 
Comes Naturally.” Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, Vol 31, No 3 (2010): 
49-56. 
The author, Matt Garcia focuses on how Loving v. Virginia influenced the rise of 
colorblind ideology in the U.S. Garcia notes that colorblindness is most often used by 
conservatives to legitimate individual responsibility, rather than state aid or recognition. 
Garcia cites Loving v. Virginia as well as other texts and an interview to support this 
argument. 
2. Golebiowska, Ewa A. “The Contours and Etiology of Whites’ Attitudes Toward 
Black-White Interracial Marriage.” Journal of Black Studies, Vol 38, No 2 (2007): 
268 – 287. 
Golebiowska states that the purpose of this article is to investigate the significance 
of racial stereotypes on whites’ opposition to interracial, specifically Black-White, 
marriage.  Golebiowska begins by noting that overcoming legal barriers does not 
necessarily mean that the overall social opinion has changed. She uses a national survey, 
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the 2000 GSS, to assess Caucasian American’s attitudes toward interracial marriage. 
Golebiowska also uses a survey that specifically asks if respondents would be okay with 
a family member entering into an interracial marriage. She found that whites are hesitant 
to accept such a union in their own family, and that there is still a preference for marrying 
within one’s own race. Yet, intergroup contact and social factors can and do influence 
this attitude, with a trend towards acceptance of interracial marriages. Golebiowska also 
found a decline in negative stereotypes about African Americans, but that belief in such 
stereotypes, if present, reduces acceptance of interracial unions. 
3. Humes, Karen R., Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez.  “Overview of Race and 
Hispanic Origin 2010.” 2010 Census Briefs, United States Census Bureau, 
C2010BR-02 (March, 2011): 1-24. Accessed 27 January 2012. 
In the United States census, “race” is divided into 6 different categories that 
respondents can choose from: White, Black or African American, American Indian or 
Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and Some Other Race 
(starting on the 2000 census). Each of the six categories is also specifically defined. 
Beginning in 2000, respondents were able to mark more than one category for race, 
indicating Two Or More Races or “In Combination” racial mixtures. Although this is a 
recent change in the census, this new ability to indicate a mixed racial ancestry indicates 
that the federal government recognizes that racial mixing is a common occurrence, and 
one that must be taken into account for an accurate assessment of the U.S. population. 
Ethnicity is basically divided into Hispanic Origin and Non-Hispanic, and is then 
combined with race categories to indicate, even more specifically, someone’s racial and 
ethnic composition. 
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4. Jacobson, Cardell K. & Bryan R. Johnson. “Interracial Friendship and African 
American Attitudes about Interracial Marriage.” Journal of Black Studies Vol. 36, 
No. 4 (March, 2006): 570-584. Accessed 27 January 2012. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40034771. 
The authors of this article hypothesize that having more close contact, and 
especially having friendships with, members of another racial group improves the in-
group’s perception of interracial marriages between members of their own group and 
members of another race. They look specifically at how African Americans perceive 
interracial marriage, whereas most studies focus on the Caucasian American perception 
of these relationships. By examining a 2000 national survey conducted by the New York 
Times, they concluded that, more than any of the other factors they controlled for, 
friendship with members of another race is the most (positive) influential pressure on 
perception of interracial marriages. In laymen terms, having at least one, if not more, 
close friendship with a person of a different race implies that the individual will have a 
more positive opinion of interracial relationships and interracial marriage. The authors 
note that although approval ratings are high overall, the number of interracial marriages is 
disproportionately small compared to the population. One reason given as to the low 
marriage rate between races is the control over partner selection exerted by the African 
American community. The authors propose that men, people with higher educational 
attainment, and people with more intergroup contact will be more likely to approve of 
interracial marriages. This article offers support for the increased social acceptance of 
interracial relationships because there have been increasing interracial interaction and 
friendships sine the Civil Rights Movement of the mid to late 1960s; following the logic 
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of Jacobson and Johnson, this increase would lead to an increased acceptance of 
interracial marriage. 
5. Johnson, Bryan R. and Cardell K. Jacobson. “Contract in Context: An Examination of 
Social Setting on Whites’ Attitudes Towards Interracial Marriage.” Social 
Psychology Quarterly, Vol 68, No 4 (2005): 387 – 399. 
This article examines the role of intergroup contact on perception of and attitude 
toward interracial marriages. Jacobson and Johnson propose that increase contact 
between group members, in the right settings, promotes acceptance of interracial 
relationships. They also take into account the role of society in determining individual’s 
attitudes. Jacobson and Johnson found a significant influence of age, political stance, 
education level, and intergroup contact on attitudes. They also found that white approval 
of interracial marriage has increase over time. They used a national survey conducted by 
the New York Times via telephone interviews to analyze attitudinal change. 
6. Monahan, Thomas P. “An Overview of Statistics on Interracial Marriage in the United 
States, with Data on Its Extent from 1963-1970.” Journal of Marriage and the 
Family Vol. 38, No. 2 (May 1976): 223-230. Accessed January 27, 2012. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/350382. 
              Monahon discusses how, since the onset of the Civil Rights Movement, 
reference to race and color had begun to be removed from many public records. This 
makes tracking the statistics on interracial marriage difficult. Monahan examines the 
interracial marriage statistics in the years immediately following the legalization of 
interracial marriage, due to Loving v. Virginia (1967-1970), and looks specifically at 
which gender of the marriage unit is the non-Caucasian race. He notes that interracial 
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marriages, in general, are continuously increasing over time, and that African American 
men are more likely to marry outside of their own race except for in the South of the 
U.S., where African American women are the most likely to marry outside of their own 
race. However, the article only breaks the groups into “Negro”, “White”, and “Other 
Race”, significantly limiting the accuracy and amount of information provided. Even 
then, Monahan notes that the number of interracial marriages is disproportionately small 
compared to the population. Significant to note is that the District of Columbia was the 
only district in the U.S. to have a higher than 1% interracial marriage rate prior to 1967, 
and that the majority of interracial marriages were Caucasian men and African American 
women. 
7. U.S. Census Bureau. “Population.” U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (2011): 1-62. Accessed 27 January 2012.  
This subsection of the information section of the 2010 U.S. Census discusses the 
population of the U.S. in particular reference to both race and the category of marriage. It 
provides definitions that the federal government uses to assess census results as well as 
numerous tables that statistically chart the census results, including results on race and 
interracial marriage. It goes into more detail about how the 2000 census differed from 
previous censuses in regard to race and ethnicity. In particular, the 2000 census was the 
first to allow respondents to mark multiple race groups and to identify as Some Other 
Race. The 2000 census also offered 15 distinct racial categories as well as added space to 
elaborate or create a unique racial category. This change indicates a raising awareness of 
race and ethnicity as part of an individual’s identity, the increasing awareness and 
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acceptance of multiple racial and ethnic compositions, and shows that both race and 
ethnicity are still an important marker is American society. 
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APPENDIX D 
Richard and Mildred Loving, and their three children, in 1965 
Photos by Grey Villet from “The Crime of Being Married,” LIFE Magazine, 18 March 
1966. 
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ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Chapter One: Pace v. Alabama 
U.S. Supreme Court Pace v. State of Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (January 29, 1883). 
Accessed from http://www.lovingday.org/pace-v-alabama. 
          This is the decision of the court in the Pace v. Alabama U.S. 
Supreme Court case, and the reasoning behind that decision. According to 
the court, the Alabama statute which proscribes different punishments for 
the crime of living in “adultery or fornication” depending on the racial 
composition of the couple does not violate the 14
th
 Amendment. The court 
stated that because each person in the couples, whether same race or 
interracial, are punished equally under this law, the difference in the 
punishments is based no the crime itself, not on race. This decision 
conveniently overlooked that the difference between the punishments was 
inherently based on race, since the only difference between the crimes was 
the race of the individuals accused. 
Chapter One and Two: Between the Cases 
Gregory, J. W. The Colour Bar: Mixed Marriages and the Colour Bar. Spectator (147), 
75. 18 July 1931. 
          This article begins by stating that color alone is not an adequate 
criterion to determine race. The author proceeds to state that the mixing of 
races tends to result in progeny that are “handicapped by some 
deficiency.” Gregory appears surprised to report that some of the 
mulattoes in the United States have shown high intelligence and physical 
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abilities, but quickly compensates for this contradiction by stating that the 
(Black) women chosen by (White) men are the most attractive and 
intelligent of their race, and have passed on these superior qualities to their 
children via the long process of sexual selection preformed by White men. 
The author concludes that these are the exceptions and that, “intermarriage 
between the three human races should be avoided as far as possible,” due 
to the “production of types [children] inferior to both parent stocks.” In 
order to ensure there is no unfavorable racial mixing, Gregory proposes 
spatial segregation of the races.  
Judge Lectures Acquitted Mixed Marriage Pair. Norfolk New Journal and Guide. 10 May 
1930. p.A1 
          This article discussed the 1930 acquittal of an interracial couple in 
Virginia. Emil E. Umlauf, a White former sergeant of police, and his 
“colored” wife were acquitted of violating the 1924 Virginia Racial 
Integrity Act, but were ordered to leave the city or face being arrested 
again. The judge, on ordering the couple to vacate the city, told Umlauf 
that, “It was a mistake of nature to endow you with the greater advantage 
and outlook that it gives to a white man.” In the post-Pace and pre-Perez 
era, especially in the South, Whites felt confident in their ability to 
prohibit interracial marriage under law. There had been no successful 
challenge to miscegenation law and no reason for this judge to feel that he 
was, in any way, prohibited from banning the couple from his jurisdiction. 
Although this case received statewide attention, the focus of this attention 
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was on the outrage exhibited by the community towards Umlauf for 
marrying a colored woman. There was even an attempt to further charge 
the couple by proving that they had left Virginia with the intention to get 
married and return (which would violate Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act); 
however this endeavor proved unsuccessful. The article, in no way, 
reported that the laws prohibiting interracial marriage or any of the legal 
actions taken against the couple were unusual or unconstitutional. 
Slavery – Black and White. Chicago Defender (14 Dec 1912). 
          This article discussed the negative reactions of White American to 
the marriage of Jack Johnson, a Black man, and Lucile Cameron, a White 
woman. The article is clearly biased against White society and the 
persecution of Johnson. The author stated that any negativity towards the 
marriage, which was performed in full accordance with the law, stemmed 
from the prejudice of Whites. The author also acknowledged that White 
men enjoyed sexual access to Black women, but reserve sole access to 
White women. The article ends by stating that it would be better for 
marriage between the races to be recognized than to have illegitimate 
offspring of such unions, since interracial sex is bound to occur regardless 
of the legal stance of interracial marriage. 
Chapter Two: Perez v. Sharp 
Georgia Bias Halts White Californian. Atlanta Daily World, p. 1, col. 1. 26 March 1955. 
          This article recounts the legal impediment faced by a White man 
who wanted to marry a Japanese woman and move to Georgia. Georgia 
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state law prohibited Whites from marrying anyone considered to be non-
White. This article brings into question the right of a White man to marry 
anyone of his choosing. This was the particular legal conundrum that 
miscegenation law could not overcome. White men presumed to have the 
right to marry whomever they chose, yet miscegenation law, intended to 
“protect” White women, also limited the right of White men. The tone of 
this article indicates indignation towards the state for limiting a White 
American man’s right to marry. 
Golden, Joseph. “Social Control of Negro-White Intermarriage.” Social Forces (36), p. 
267. 1957/1958. 
          This article begins by recognizing that any segregation, even if 
written into the law, is primarily enforced by, and given power through, 
public sentiment. Golden notes that the definition of Black varies from 
state to state, and that punishments for interracial marriage vary similarly. 
Furthermore, Golden insinuates that these classifications lack scientific 
evidence by stating that California repealed its miscegenation legislation, 
Perez v. Sharp, in light of recent scientific and sociological publications. 
In this overturning, the California court states that, “marriage is something 
more than a civil contract, subject to regulation by the state. It is a 
fundamental right of free men.” However, Golden does state that 
interracial marriage violates sexual mores, and that society and the family 
have an obligation to prohibit, as far as possible, interracial marriages 
since they are “inadvisable on social and cultural grounds.” 
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“High Court Asked to Reject Petition on Marriage Issue.” Atlanta Daily World, p. 3 col. 
7. 6 October 1954. 
          This news article covers the request of the state of Alabama for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to deny Linnie Jackson a review of her conviction for 
marrying a White man. This request is based on the 1883 decision in Pace, 
as well as the 1901 revision to the Alabama constitution which provided 
that the state may never authorize or legalize any marriage between 
anyone colored and anyone White. According to the author, the only 
miscegenation case to date that had been held valid was that of Perez v. 
Sharp, and the article attests that Alabama claims Perez was settled on 
unsound legal theory. 
“Mixed Marriage Faces Top Court in Mississippi.” Norfolk New Journal and Guide. 25 
December 1948. 
          This article discusses the trial of a Black man who was sentenced to 
five years imprisonment for marrying a White woman. The trial traced the 
ancestry of the accused in order to prove that, per the blood quantum rule, 
the defendant had Black ancestry. This classified him as a “Negro,” the 
therefore legally unable to marry anyone White. Tracing someone’s 
ancestry to prove that they have Black heritage was a common way to 
invalidate an interracial marriage, and was highly effective, especially in 
the South. 
Rogers, J. A. “Rogers Says: Great Comedy Found in Marriage and Divorce Laws of this 
Country.” Norfolk New Journal and Guide. 25 December 1948. 
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          In this article, Rogers discusses his opinion of U.S. marriage law, 
particularly the practice of leaving legislation up to the individual 
discretion of states, rather than having uniform federal laws. Rogers states 
that the numerous and drastically varying marriage laws are confusing, 
and often contradict those of other states. Rogers goes further than the 
issue of states’ rights by noting that the reason for the differences in the 
realm of interracial marriage is White supremacy. Rogers believes that 
uniform marriage law will not be achieved because that would require 
either the end to, or the spread of, miscegenation law, with each side 
opposing the imposition of the other. 
“Stand Up and Sound Off, Supreme Court of California Case: Perez v. Sharp.” The 
Multiracial Activist. 1999. Accessed 16 September 2013. 
http://www.multiracial.com/government/perez-v-sharp.html. 
          This document is composed of select excepts from the decision of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor in the Perez v. Sharp decision, as well as 
concurring opinions from fellow justices. All of the decisions discuss statements 
made and precedent relied on throughout the trial. Previous Supreme Court cases, 
as well as the Constitution, were referred to throughout the decision to lend 
support to the decision of the court. 
 “The People Think.” Los Angeles Sentinel. 9 January 1947 
          This article discussed a study undertaken at Los Angeles City 
College, which polled Black and White students of both genders on their 
opinion of interracial marriage. Students of both races and genders split on 
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the issue. Some students cited morality and the intention of God; others 
stated that there were too many social and cultural differences. Yet, some 
students believed that intermarriage could promote greater acceptance and 
understanding between the races, and that the resulting children would 
ease the racial line. This article shows how the post World War II era was 
marked by social liberalization, particularly in regard to race. 
Traynor, Roger R. “Majority Opinion, Perez v. Sharp (1948).” Organization of American 
Historians (OAH) Magazine of History, Vol 18, No 4 (July 2004): 34 – 36. 
           Justice Roger R. Traynor gave the majority opinion in the 1948 California 
Supreme Court case Perez v. Sharp, which recognized the bans on interracial 
marriage violated the 14
th
 Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In his majority 
opinion, acknowledging the right of the couple to marry, Traynor cited that 
although it was the right of states to regulate marriage, limiting someone’s choice 
of partner due to race thereby limited their right to marry, which is a right 
protected under the 14
th
 Amendment. However, there were many extenuating 
circumstances that aided Traynor in making his decision. To begin, the couple 
was a Hispanic American woman and an African American man, so neither 
partner was Caucasian, and the court may have seen their union as less 
threatening than if the woman had been white. Secondly, the couple had the 
support of the Catholic Church in their union, and limiting their right to marry 
was, therefore, also infringing on their right to have a Catholic service and their 
right to free practice of religion. Finally, Traynor cited state’s rights to support the 
majority opinion, which kept the decision within California and did not threaten 
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the “sanctity” or marriage of any other state. However, it was instances such as 
this that eventually prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to legalize interracial 
marriage in the 1967 Loving v. Virginia case. 
Chapter Three: Loving v. Virginia 
“An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity,” Racial Integrity Act of 1924, 
http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/encounter/projects/monacans/Contemporary_Mon
acans/racial.html. 
          This source is the text from the Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, passed by 
the General Assembly of Virginia in 1924. This act effectively banned all 
interracial marriages in the state of Virginia, and established guidelines for 
ensuring that no White married a non-White. This act was the legislation that led 
to the arrest of Richard and Mildred Loving, thereby beginning the Loving v. 
Virginia trial. 
 “Bad Marriage Law Revoked, 9-0.” Plain Dealer. 13 June 1967. Cleveland, OH. 
          This article clearly supported the decision of the Supreme Court in 
the Loving case, stating that the Constitution is so explicit on the freedom 
to marry without regard to race that, “it is surprising that the ban enforced 
by 16 states could have lasted as long as it did.” The article seems to 
unquestionably accept the decision of the Court and to apply the Loving 
decision to all other states, recognizing that miscegenation was now 
federally outlawed. “It is simply not possible for a state law to be valid 
under our Constitution which makes the criminality of (an) act depend 
upon the race of the actor” [Justice Potter Stewart]. 
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“Excerpts From Supreme Court’s Ruling on Virginia’s Ban on Miscegenation.” New 
York Times. 13 June 1967. 
          This article accompanied the previous article in the June 13 New 
York Times, and summarized the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in 
the Loving v. Virginia case by restating select statements made at the trial 
and in the historic Loving decision. 
 “Justice Upset All Bans On Interracial Marriage: 9-0n Decision Rules Out Virginia 
Law.” New York Times. 13 June 1967. 
          Unlike other articles covering the Loving decision, the New York 
Times notes that “the wording [of the decision] was sufficiently broad and 
disapproving to leave no doubt that the antimiscegenation laws of 15 other 
states are also now void.” The Times also stated that “Chief Justice 
Warren completed the process that he set in motion with his opinion in 
1954 [Brown v. Board of Education],” suggesting that it was largely due to 
Chief Justice Warren’s influence that discriminatory laws were being 
overturned at the federal level. The author further states that “racial 
classifications in state laws are constitutionally odious even if the 
punishments are even-handed,” hence the decision to overturn 
miscegenation law via the Loving case. The author does not indicate a 
stance on miscegenation, but focuses on Warren and the repercussions of 
the Loving decision. 
Loving v. Virginia. “Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 388 U.S. 1 Loving et ux. v. 
Virginia. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. No. 395.” 
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(Argued 10 April 1967. Decided 12 June 1967): 1-6. Accessed 27 January 2012. 
           Loving v. Virginia was the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court case that legalized 
interracial marriage at a federal level. Until 1967, states had reserved the right to 
legalize or ban interracial marriages, and to decide whether to acknowledge 
interracial marriages performed in other states. After Loving v. Virginia, states 
were required to legally allow interracial couples the right to marry, and were 
required to acknowledge interracial marriages performed in other states, thereby 
granting interracial marriage a legal standing equivalent to intraracial marriage. 
This document is a summary of the proceedings and results of this trial. It 
discusses the background of the couple, their situation in Virginia, their pursuit of 
the case at a federal level, and the implications of the decision of this case. 
Considered a landmark case in U.S. history, especially in reference to race-
relations within the U.S., this document will serve as the basis for much of the 
evidence reported in support of liberalized ideas of interracial marriages in the 
U.S. since 1967. 
“Mixed Marriage Decision Lifts ‘Great Burden.’” Springfield Union. 13 
June 1967. Springfield, MA. 
          This brief article focuses on the reactions of the Lovings to the court 
decision upholding their marriage and overturning the Virginia 
miscegenation law. The author notes the reactions of both Mildred and 
Richard, both of whom express great relief that their legal battle is over, 
and that the legality of their marriage was recognized. Furthermore, the 
article noted that Richards stated that he and Mildred did not encounter 
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any hostility from their community during the decade that their case was 
tried through the local, state, and federal courts. 
“Race Laws ‘Knocked Off Books’ – McLeod.” Augusta Chronicle. 13 
June 1967. Augusta, GA. 
          This article, although published in Georgia, discusses the reaction of 
the South Carolina Attorney General, Daniel R. McLeod, to the decision 
in the Loving case. McLeod stated that this decision would appear to 
overrule the South Carolina law banning interracial marriages, but that the 
law would likely remain on the books and simply be unenforced, unless a 
test case caused revision of the law. According to the author, McLeod 
believed the Loving decision would help South Carolina because it would 
erase the confusion concerning exactly who can and cannot get married. 
McLeod does not seem to oppose interracial marriage, and appears 
unconcerned about the result of the Loving case. 
“Relic of Discrimination.” Evening Times. 14 June 1967. Trenton, NJ. 
          This article clearly views miscegenation laws as discriminatory and 
supports the decision of Loving, but also states that, “Relatively few 
people, of course, are involved in such marriages,” indicating a belief that 
Americans should be allowed to marry whomever they chose, but that they 
typically chose to marry within their own race. The author seems torn 
between social norms against interracial marriage and the American ideals 
of equality and freedom. From the tone of the article, I interpret the author 
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as supportive of what Loving represented, but somewhere between 
indifferent and disapproving of the reality of interracial marriage. 
 “The Crime of Being Married.” LIFE Magazine. 18 March 1966. Reprinted 2012. 
          On the 45
th
 anniversary of the Loving v. Virginia decision LIFE 
reprinted the original story they had published in 1966 covering the 
Loving’s story, along with a new introduction and photographs of the 
Lovings that had not yet been published. The original article focused on 
the story of the couple, rather than on the trial. The article discusses the 
unique case of Caroline County, the Lovings hometown, where very little 
distinction was made between the races. When the article was published in 
1966, LIFE speculated that, “Loving v. Virginia may well become the next 
big landmark in civil rights.” The Lovings were not prepared for the 
opposition they had encountered when they married since Caroline County 
residents “have grown accustomed to the [Lovings] marriage,” and they 
generally encountered hostility only from those outside of the local 
community. According to LIFE, “The State [Virginia] insists that the 14
th
 
Amendment exempts anti-miscegenation statutes from its coverage, and 
that there is no constitutionally protected right of a free choice of a spouse 
in marriage.” The 1966 LIFE article suggests that the case comes down to 
the question of constitutional rights, free choice in marriage, and the 
question of state rights versus federal regulation. Overall, the LIFE article 
seems to have a liberal tone that most previous articles lacked, 
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highlighting the right of individuals to choose to marry whomever they 
love. 
“Top Court Voids Intermarriage Bans.” Evening Times. 12 June 1967. Trenton, NJ. 
          This article discusses the decision of the Loving case with a very 
factual tone. The author does not refer to Mildred Loving by name, 
referring to her only as the “Negro wife” of the “white construction 
worker, Richard P. Loving.” The article notes that the decision was 9-0 to 
overturn the Virginia miscegenation law, but notes that 15 other states 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Caroline, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia) also have miscegenation bans. The 
author does not discuss the implications of Loving for these states. The 
article reports excerpts from the Warren opinion (opinion of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren), including his statement that, “Marriage is one of the ‘basic 
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival. […] 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
state.” 
Epilogue 
Defense of Marriage Act. “Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One-Hundred and Fourth 
Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 3396: Defense of Marriage Act.” (15 May 
1996): 1-247. Accessed 27 January 2012.  
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           The Defense of Marriage Act was an act that was presented to the United 
States Congress in May 1996. It was not an act that wanted to limit same-sex 
marriage for anti-homosexual reasons, but rather was enacted in order to defend 
the principle of states’ rights over the rights of the federal government in regard 
specifically to same-sex marriage legislation. It established that states have the 
right to decide policies towards same-sex unions on a state-by-state basis. 
D.O.M.A. also stipulates that the federal government cannot demand that all 
states legalize same-sex marriage or be forced to recognize same-sex marriages 
performed in other states. It largely focuses on a case of same-sex marriage in 
Hawaii where the couple was allowed to marry and was formally recognized as 
married in Hawaii, but not in all states. Although it seems that the opinion of 
many on the committee is in support for same-sex marriage, they have to place 
states’ rights above their personal opinions on the issue, and above the power of 
the federal government. 
Respect for Marriage Act. “H. R. 3567: To repeal the Defense of Marriage Act and    
Ensure Respect for State Regulation of Marriage.” One-Hundredth and Eleventh 
Congress, First Session (15 September 2009): 1-3. Accessed 27 January 2012. 
           The Respect for Marriage Act was proposed in 2009 as the act to be used in 
place of the Defense of Marriage Act. It promotes a federal-level use of same-sex 
marriage in the sense that a marriage considered valid in the state in which it was 
performed must be considered valid in the other states of the U.S. This would 
deviate from the previously established norm of states’ rights superseding federal 
jurisdiction in the case of same-sex marriages. However, it does not require that 
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every state legalize same-sex marriage, and does not federally legalize same-sex 
marriage. This act is directed more at rectifying the legal issues that arise when a 
marriage is only considered legally valid in some states. Because crossing state 
borders is not difficult, it becomes complicated for a couple to know if their 
marriage will still be considered valid, and can greatly limit their mobility. This 
act would rectify this issue by guarantying recognition to all marriages legally 
performed, regardless of which state they were performed in. 
Secondary Sources – Used Throughout Thesis 
Abbott, Elizabeth. A History of Marriage. Penguin Group, Canada: 2012. 
           Elizabeth Abbott examined marriage as an institution, across national 
borders and cultural divides. She particularly focuses on the argument that 
marriage is not a stable concept and cannot simply be defined as a “union 
between one man and one woman.” Marriage is transformative, and Abbott 
provides ample examples of how marriage has changed throughout history. She 
emphasizes the changing role of women in marriage, the different forms of 
marriage (arranged, self-marriage, state-sanctioned marriage, etc.), and social 
influences on the institution of marriage, such as community involvement, 
church and state regulation, familial involvement, and children. 
Coontz, Stephanie. Marriage, A History: From obedience to intimacy or how love 
conquered marriage. Viking, New York: 2005. 
           Stephanie Coontz argues that there is no “traditional” marriage, and she 
goes through centuries, nations, and cultures to provide evidence for her claim. 
She particularly focuses on the male-female, husband-wife dynamic, and how it 
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has transformed within the marriage relationship. Furthermore, Coontz brings 
the past and the present realities of marriage to a head, by showing how the 
institution has changes in specific ways, citing the revolutions of women in the 
workforce, voting rights, and the introduction of birth control. Coontz brings a 
somewhat feminist, or at least female-centric, tone to the study of marriage. 
Cott, Nancy. Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge: 2000. 
           Nancy Cott focuses on how marriage is not a private union between two 
people, but is actually a public institution, very much subject to social and 
government regulation. Focusing on marriage in the United States, Cott 
examines how the traditional conception of marriage, and the regulations in 
place to uphold this definition, stems from Judeo-Christian principles and 
English common law. However, Cott continues on to show how the changes in 
American law and society over centuries transformed the definition of marriage; 
in sum, Cott reveals how the state and federal governments have regulated and, 
in many ways, controlled what is considered to be a “private” choice in order to 
sculpt the moral and social standards of the nation. In this way, she focuses 
much of the attention on the legislation and legal issues in marriage, but she 
also discusses social influences on the institution of marriage. 
Pascoe, Peggy. What Comes Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in 
America. Oxford University Press, New York: 2009. 
           Peggy Pascoe, in her examination of marriage, focuses exclusively on 
miscegenation in America. She traces the origins, logic behind, and 
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transnational repercussions of interracial marriage bans, shedding light on one 
of the most ingrained and longest lasting regulations on the institution of 
marriage. Pascoe discusses intermarriage between Caucasian Americans and 
Americans of nearly every other ethnic and racial composition, looking and the 
social and legal influences and prohibitions on their marriages. She goes 
further, looking at how White Supremacy, sexuality, and gender all influenced 
miscegenation law. Pascoe investigates intermarriage in the U.S. from both a 
social and legal stance, and discusses some of the legislation that was influential 
in the overturning of intermarriage bans, as well as examining the social forces 
that allowed for this transformation to the institution of marriage. 
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